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The Fall of the Israeli Empire

By Stirling Newberry

Face with a week of failure, mounting deaths, and international opprobrium for the hundreds of civilian dead left behind by air strikes, Olmert has ordered the expected big push into Lebanon, tripling the Israeli invasion force. The object is to end the rocket attacks that have killed 51 Israeli civilians, and to put down a revolt on the right flank of the Government. Likud, hammered in Sharon's snap elections, has declared that it wants to bring down Olmert.

Haaretz documented the fialures of the Israeli military, particularly the shattering of the "Merkava myth" as a nearly invulnerasble tank. So far it is Hezbollah that has performed above expectations, even their own, in that they did not put their best unit in front. But now, it is crunch time.



While the UN votes for an "immediate cease fire", the war goes on. Israel's talking points are increasingly thin, and there are clear implications that the war will represent a significant blow to Israel's prestige. The big push seems to be an attempt to gain a political victory out of a military loss. Hezbollah has become one and the same with a Lebanese resistence, and is now a power center to be reckoned with. They are, for all intents and purposes, the most powerful armed force in Lebanon's politics.

The wider implications for this push cannot be underestimated. First, Israel is turning itself into a political liability at the very moment when the United States wants to negotiate itself out of Iraq. At the very moment when it needs Islamic support for anti-terrorism, and at the very moment when the domestic political situation in the United States is turning against the kind of goonilateralism that Olmert has undertaken. For a brief moment Olmert had almost all of world Jewish public opinion behind him, that unity is rapidly collapsing, as the left sees him as an incompetent butcher, and the right as not sufficiently competent at butchery.

The United States must also think long and hard about what the results of the first phase of this conflict means. The Rumsfeldian small and light approach has had its tombstone carved along the Litani - the light infantry of Hezbollay might not be able to take the brunt of a full assault - the results will only be known over time -but they are clearly capable of dealing with lesser thrusts that rely overly much on technological superiority, and not enough on volume of fire power.

The fig leaf offensive will not fundamentally alter this balance. Nor will it change the perception of Israeli vulnerability, of a military that has lived on its laurels, and become street brawlers used to fighting rabble.

The prognostication for Israel varies. Some observers, like John Robb, urge Israel to meet infantry with infantry, others see Israel's problem as not going in for the large invasion sooner. The political advice however, boils down to the same reality - Israel must acknowledge a changed state on the ground.

My own view is that Israeli empire - its control over subject people's - has been eroding and is now doomed. Sharon's attempt was to reduce the imperial committment, and thus make it more sustainable. However all he managed to do is turn the imperial zone from one which the Israeli's occupied, into one that they were repeatedly obliged to invade or attack, and not just in Lebanon.

The result is that Israel must either accept that it is about to become a state whose power and core are roughly the same, and deal with subject areas on an equal basis, or face a growing series of strikes at the core of its economic and political existence.

Take, for example, the surprise that the Merkava tank has underperformed.

This should be less of a surprise than it is. The tank is clearly designed for "crew survivability" and transport capacity. It has been modified for urban combat, which, according to "experts" should not have changed its combat characteristics. This again, seems to be nothing short of disinformation. The armor isn't sufficient to stand up to even hand held arms fire, let alone what 120mm anti-tank rounds could do. The tank is also too heavy - nearly as heavy as the M-1 Abrams.

Consider for example one of the reports from the link above:

At around 1:40 P.M., an IDF Merkava tank was struck by an explosive device in the village of Aita al-Shaab in the western sector. The tank's four crew members were killed instantly. The IDF is still investigating the source of the explosion. The kind of damage sustained by the tank (its turret was blown off) appears to indicate that the vehicle was hit by a large explosive device, but a senior Northern Command officer told Haaretz on Wednesday night that it was more likely that the Merkava had been hit by an anti-tank missile.


Turrets blown off, crew killed instantly.

The Lebanon conflict is having the same results that similar actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, namely the ability of a light force to stymie a mechanized military. The methods of Hezbollah are an improvment in every way over the Sunni rebellion in Iraq - they are able to take out tanks, and their crews, with far more regularity than the rebels are. Part of this is terrain, part of this is, clearly, that the Merkava 3 Baz and Merkava 4 are over-rated.

However, the first conclusion that we can draw is that we are watching the fall of the Israeli Empire. An empire is a state which rules over non-citizen populations integrated into its power structure. Israel, while a small empire, is still an empire, with subject territories which dominate its resources, command and control decisions, and military profile.

Some will object to this characterization, on the grounds that Israel has elections and a democracy. But empires have often had democratic cores - including Athens, Rome, The British Empire. The United States has been called an imperial power - even by some who are proud of the nature of the US as empire. New York is, after all, the "Empire State". The defining characteristic of an empire is the division between subjects and citizens, and the exploitation of subjects for the benefit of the citizens. Israel meets this test.

One of the characteristics of this empire, is that it has been able, over the last 40 years, to militarily dominate or deter larger states around it. It was a matter of survival for Israel to have a "near abroad", and to carve out buffer zones to hold key military points. But this relied on the perception that conflict with Israel was political suicide - that to fight with Israel is to lose to Israel.

However, the last invasion run by Israel is now almost 25 years ago. Since then, the imperial capacity has dominated their doctrine, and hardware, and their decisions reflect this. Go to any article on the Merkava tank, and you will read that it was designed for crew survivability. Empire's have a basic reality, a small core of privileged people having to dominate a poorer rapidly growing population. They must either coِpt, or crush, those under their control.

Israel's policies have focused on dealing with the politically unstable Palestinian presence in "their" imperial zone. The Palestinians have repeatedly chosen to align themselves with external elements, and take money to act as the front line against Israel itself. The Israeli governments however, had to continually undercut the Palestinian economic development, in order to promote their own immigration. The combination of a PLO unwillingness to seek autonomy, and Israeli intransigence on providing an economically viable state - that is, the insistence on remaining an empire - have created a perpetual stalemate situation.

This also led to the Israeli military degrading with respect to its core mission of strategic deterrence. The Merkava 4 has not performed as well as even the much maligned Merkava 1. It has not performed as well as the improvements to power to weight ratio would indicate. The front mounted engine has proven to be a mistake in attempting tactical advances and operational occupation of land, as would be expected.

In short the job of fighting "rabble" in Israel's core imperial area, has destroyed its capabilities in dealing with its imperial peripheries. One of the most import of these, since it is a failed state, is the northern border with Lebanon, where states which do not have the will to directly confront Israel supply proxies. Hezbollah is a proxy army for Syria and Iran. The difference is that it is a capable army, and it is facing an Israeli military that has clearly been living on its reputation.

The result is that Olmert, who only two weeks ago was master of the Israeli political universe, and seemed to have grown into Sharon's shoes, is now beset from left and right in the Knesset, and no longer commands a governing majority on certain issues. In short, the governing core of Israel is split over the current action. Sharon cannot dump Labor and govern, and yet it is likely that Labor is the group that wants to restrain the Israeli invasion. Olmert's course is going to be pressured to call new elections with Likud as the senior partner in a new government.

Israel no longer has the will to be an empire.

This leads to the second essential point: the action against Hezbollah has implications for the United States and the West. The United States, in particularly, has chosen to deal with the problem of militant Islamic terrorism as a military proposition. To some extent this was driven by domestic considerations: politics and the access to the power that being at war creates. However, it was also because of the perception that military means were the area where the West had the most lopsided advantages over the enemy. Perceptions are reality, until reality puts an RPG28 between the chassis/turret gap on your tank.

The very approach of militarization of the problem is called into question. Not only has it generally failed, but the failure as been progressive:

Afghanistan was invaded, a civilian government brought on line rapidly, and the situation stabilized, even if the general trend was slowly towards a de facto partition of the state.

Iraq was invaded, but a stable civilian government has proven elusive, and the territory of the state remains out of control in key areas.

In Lebanon, Israel has not only failed to invade, but it did what did not happen in Iraq or Afghanistan - namely, it created the opposition of other states to its actions. Israel the state is at war with Lebanon, the state.

This progression of failure has led to the speculation that Hezbollah is the template for a defensive light infantry force which is designed to make large mechanized militaries bleed. This has happened before. The first generation of fully mechanized military was able to deal with partisans and light infantry, allowing it to crush insurrections, except in unfriendly terrain such as the jungles of Vietnam - until the late 1960's. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was confirmation that the mass mobilization military was no longer able to cope with guerilla forces. Through out the 1970's and 1980's guerilla movements festered, often backed by the Soviet Union or China.

However this military generation with vulnerable infantry and lack of precision munitions, as well as primitive communications and fire control systems, was increasingly under pressure, because while it could kill more enemies than it lost, it lost high value lives in return for easier to replace attrition fighters. The "revolution in military affairs" changed this equation, putting the mechanized military back in control of the equation. By being able to flood an area with firepower, and having the speed to rapidly reach key political objectives, dictate peace and leave, the new model military circumvented these problems, and with high volume of firepower, electronic intelligence (elint) and mobility, was able to hold such insurgencies at bay.

Al-Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan represented a first attempt to create a guerilla counter-force to the "Air-Land Battle". Their manifest inability to blunt the edge of the sword was clearly noted. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban returned to more traditional guerilla tactics.

The next attempt at a blunting force was seen for a very brief period in the early invasion of Iraq, where the US military invasion, stripped of key numerical and strategic advantages, was often out maneuver or slowed by inferior forces. However, the successes of Saddam's Fedakeen fighters were limited, localized and the result of an invasion force fighting "one hand tied behind its back". It was also not politically stable - with bribes being capable of prying people loose from active opposition.

This third attempt has been wildly more successful. It has taken out main battle tanks, killed their crews, remained in supply, thwarted the taking of political and military objectives, delivered a blow to the Israeli body politic. This is not to say that it has "won" - conflicts, particularly long conflicts such the one over control over the Biqa and southern Lebanon ebb and flow, and it is within the realm of possibility that the Israelis will change course and either engage in a full scale ground invasion, dictate peace and get out. However, their present tactical posture leads only to more losses, both physical and political.

Since major states have relied on the ability to threaten invasion and overthrow, or the ability to inflict punishing losses on minor states, the ability for light infantry again to offer a resistance to invasion alters the balance considerably. When combined with Weapons of Mass Destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, it will make military confrontation far less palatable to Western powers, without the need to pulverize the entire economy to become a North Korea style armed camp. Hezbollah's military participation for its population base is far below the army of Iraq currently.

This is particularly important when considering the increasing tensions with Iran – which now has much of Iraq within its sphere of influence, is developing atomic capabilities, and which desires the ability to exert counter-pressure on the United States. US foreign policy has proceeded under the assumption that a military conflict with Iran might bring about unacceptable economic losses, but that militarily, it would not inflict unacceptable casualties or degradation of equipment and organization. The results from Lebanon show that this assumption is simply not tenable in the light of the facts on the ground.

Instead the reports indicate that Hezbollah is able to maintain unit cohesion in the face of Israeli firepower and deal counter strikes. The model provided could be transported to Iran rather easily, and backed by a military of substantial size and an economy with monetary reserves, it would clearly be able to blunt an invasion of Iran by the United States. Since the Shia of Iraq are under Iran's growing umbrella, the implication is that on the day that the political will exists for the Shia to demand we leave, that they will have a military instrument capable of making staying unacceptable.

The first lesson then from Lebanon is that the second generation mechanized military, which combined mechanization with turbines, communication and materials science to produce a faster, smarter, harder hitting and better protected force, is now reaching a counter force state with respect to small man portable arms, and guerilla forces designed to blunt their movement and other advantages.

The second lesson is that Israel, the state which most directly relies on the military superiority of this instrument over its imperial zone is now faced with the necessity of either changing course, redoubling and retrippling its efforts to produce a force capable of maintaining its current imperial stance, or face a slow erosion of security and eventually exposure to shattering attacks on its economic core.

The third lesson is that this rebalancing is no longer a matter of theory to be discussed by refugees from the military establishment, but a clear tendency which electorates and elites must incorporate into their thinking. The "we will just wipe them out" thinking of the American electorate over the last 6 years, and the shock support for Olmert in Israel are examples of electorate perception not matching military reality.

It is not certain that the current trend will continue, however, for the first time, it is clear that the air land battle faces an enemy with a military imagination. In A Bright and Shining Lie one pilot reported that the shock moment for him was when the VC had learned to lead the choppers with fire, because, of course, a bullet takes time to get into the air, even though it is very fast, it is not infinitely fast. He knew he was facing a real enemy. For me the shock moment is when insurgents started burying mines and IEDs in filled in shell holes. After all, if there is fresh digging, normally a tank driver will avoid it, as a sign of danger. But of course a shell hole is filled in…

The readjustment of electorates to realities takes time. It has taken nearly 3 years for the American public to adjust its expectations in Iraq. While the strategic costs of withdrawal are high, it is becoming less clear that winning is even achievable given the commitments Americans are willing to make. The North Vietnamese used to joke that Americans ran a school for anti-aircraft training over Hanoi. It may well be the case that Iraq is a giant school for the light infantry counter-forces of the future.

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