ويكيليكس: محضر سري لاجتماع الرئيس السوري مع وفد الكونغرس الاميركي
طباعة أرسل لصديق
ترجمة : كلنا شركاء
30/ 11/ 2010
كشفت وثيقة سرية صادرة عن السفارة الأميركية في دمشق تفاصيل اللقاء الذي جميع الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد مع وفد أميركي من أعضاء في الكونغرس (الشيوخ والممثلين ) برئاسة السيناتور بنيامين كاردين جرى في شباط الماضي. وتضمنت الوثيقة التي نشرها يوم أمس موقع ويكيليكس الالكتروني العديد من النقاط أبرزها رؤية الرئيس الأسد للمصالح المشتركة بين أميركا وسورية كما تحدث عنها في هذا اللقاء.
وتشير الوثيقة بأن الأهداف الثلاثة الرئيسية التي قال الأسد أنه ينبغي لسورية وأميركا العمل عليها وخصوصا انهما يتشاركان المصلحة في 70 % من الامور والباقي هو اختلاف نتيجة وجهة النظر والثقافة والمبادئ والمقاربة هي: القضاء على أسلحة الدمار الشامل في المنطقة، السعي لمصالح مشتركة في عراق مستقر، العمل لأجل السلام ومكافحة الإرهاب.
الأسد، وبحسب الوثيقة، أعاد التأكيد أن سورية ليست عدواً للولايات المتحدة، وقال: لقد أنقذت أرواح الأميركيين. موضحاً أنه في عام 2002 سلّم معلومات لملك البحرين حول هجوم وشيك على مواطنين أميركيين. وهنا أضاف السفير عماد مصطفى، الذي كان يحضر الاجتماع، أن وزير الخارجية كولن باول بعث برسالة يعرب فيها عن امتنانه لهذه المساعدة.
وقال الأسد: اذا رغبت الولايات المتحدة بتنسيق مماثل في المستقبل، فلا يمكن لسورية أن تستأنف التعاون الأمني دون أن يكون مترافقاً مع تعاون سياسي. وحاول الأسد دحض فكرة أن الحوار الجديد بين الولايات المتحدة وسورية سيجعل فقط من سورية أقوى، إذ قال: "لا، أنتم ستجعلون من أنفسكم أقوى لأنكم لديكم مصالح في المنطقة".
وفي موضع آخر من الوثيقة تشير إلى توجه السيناتور توم أودال (أحد أعضاء الوفد الأميركي الذي التقى الأسد) للرئيس الأسد بالسؤال: ما الرسالة التي تريد من السيناتور كاردين (رئيس الوفد) إيصالها للإدارة الأميركية الجديدة. فكان جواب الأسد، أنه رأى مصلحتين مشتركتين بين سورية وأميركا وهما السلام في المنطقة ومكافحة الإرهاب.
وتحدث الأسد حول أن سورية كانت في طليعة من حارب الإرهاب منذ أن قمعت الإخوان المسلمين عام 1982، وزعم الأسد ان سورية أرسلت في منتصف الثمانينات وفداً إلى أوربا للتعبير عن الحاجة لتشكيل ائتلاف لمكافحة الإرهاب، إلا أنه لم يلق آذاناً صاغية حينها.
وقال الأسد أيضاً: إن سورية تريد أن تعرف متى ستتبنى الولايات المتحدة الأميركية نهجاً جديداً تجاه الإرهاب، مضيفاً أن السؤال لا يتعلق بكم يمكن لأميركا أن تدمّر، بل يتعلق بكم يمكنها أن تقيم من الحوارات. وتابع الأسد بالقول: الأوربيون يعرفون أكثر من الولايات المتحدة عن المنطقة. وحثّ السيناتور كاردين بالتوجه إليهم طلبا للإرشاد.
وتضيف الوثيقة في موضع آخر أنه السيناتور كاردين تطرق في حديثه مع الأسد لمسألة إغلاق سورية للمدرسة الأميركية والمركز الثقافي الأميركي، مشيراً إلى أن الإغلاق يضرّ السوريين أكثر مما يضر الأميركيين. ونقلت الوثيقة قول الأسد، أن سورية تعرضت لهجوم من قبل الولايات المتحدة قتل إثره 7 مواطنين سوريين، "وكان لدي خيارين، إما محاربة الجيش الأميركي أو أن أقوم بفعل شيء رمزي..." وأضاف الأسد لقد اخترت الامر الرمزي وهو إغلاق مؤقت، وسوف تفتح العام القادم.
وهنا نقلت الوثيقة اجابة كاردين للأسد، بأنه يتفهم كون هذه الخطوة رمزية لكن ليس حينما تضر بالشعب السوري.
وفي مكان آخر ورد ان الاسد قال : عندما جاء وليم بيرنز وممثلين عن الجيش والسي اي اي حضروا لدمشق قلنا لهم اننا جاهزون للتعاون واخذنا الوفد للحدود وبعد ان غادروا انتظرنا ان يرسلوا اقتراحاتهم ولكن لم يصلنا شيء ؟ , مما يعني انهم لا يريدون التعاون ونحن ينقصنا الموارد المالية والتقنية كي نضيق مراقبتنا للحدود مع العراق ....وتضيف الوثيقة ان الاسد ناقض نفسه بعد ذلك عندما قال : ان 80 % من السيطرة الحدود هي تماما السيطرة على البلد , وهنا تدخل عضو مجلس الممثلين مكلنتير مقاطعا هل انت مستعد لمراقبة الحدود إذاً ؟ , هنا تردد الرئيس وقال : هذه مشكلة اخرى .
وتشير الوثيقة أخيرا إلى أن اللقاء جرى في 18 شباط 2009 وجمع الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد ووزير الخارجية وليد المعلم، والسفير السوري في واشنطن عماد مصطفى، ومستشارة الرئيس السوري بثينة شعبان. فيما حضره من الجانب الأميركي أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ، بنيامين كاردين، شيلدون وايتهاوس، روجر وايكر، توم اودال،ومن مجلس الممثلين مايك ماكنتري، جوين مور، والقائمة باعمال السفارة الامريكية بدمشق مورا كونيللي، وعدد من اعضاء السفارة..
وقد نشر الموقع برقية سرية اخرى تتحدث عن محادثات الرئيس السوري مع وفد من الكونغرس ايضا في عام 2010 يتحدث فيها عن العلاقة مع ايران
http://all4syria.info/content/view/35634/75/
ممادفع البعض لكتابة مقالة بعنوان ( الثمن الذي تطلبه سوريا من اميركا مقابل تعاونها )
http://all4syria.info/content/view/35635/75/
ويذكر أن موقع ويكيليكس الالكتروني قد بدأ يوم أمس بنشر ما يقارب ربع مليون وثيقة تتعلق بمراسلات سرية بين سفارات الولايات المتحدة حول العالم ووزارة الخارجية الأميركية.
http://all4syria.info/content/view/35634/75/
secret cable : US congressional delegation ( Hunter ) meeting with President Assad
wikileaks.org
30/ 11/ 2010
SUBJECT: CODEL GREGG'S DECEMBER 30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
ASAD
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (S) Summary: In a frank one-hour meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, Senators Gregg, Bayh, Specter,
Enzi, Cornyn, and Klobuchar affirmed Washington's interest in better U.S.-Syrian relations and pushed Asad to take positive
steps as well. The senators urged Syria to move forward on security cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq, facilitating the
release of three detained Americans in Iran, and re-opening the Damascus Community School. Asad welcomed the prospect of more Congressional visits and candid exchanges, saying diplomacy had failed to solve the region's problems during
the last two decades.
-- On comprehensive peace, Asad reiterated Syria's strong desire to return to Turkish-facilitated indirect talks with
Israel as a means to establish agreed terms of reference for direct negotiations. Syria's relations with Iran should not
be linked to Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. Syria's ties to Hamas, Hizballah, and other groups could be satisfactorily
resolved only after the achievement of a comprehensive regional peace, Asad maintained.
-- The U.S. and Syria should use the next several months to improve bilateral relations so that both sides could overcome
mutual distrust that would hinder U.S. credibility as an honest broker, Asad told the senators. Later in the
discussion, FM Muallim argued the onus for taking the next positive step lay with the U.S. Syria could not move on
issues such as the American school or the Cultural Center unless Washington lifted its ban on the sale of new
commercial aircraft to Syria.
-- Calling Iran the region's most important country, Asad said the West could improve the prospects for peace by
acknowledging Iran's NPT-protected right to enrich uranium under IAEA monitoring. Asad argued the West should accept
Iran's "reasonable" counter-offer to ship several batches of low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for enrichment by other
countries, instead of insisting Iran ship all of its LEU at once. Asad said he believed Iran was not interested in
pursuing a nuclear weapon, but warned that an Israeli military strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure would fail
to disable the program and would only increase Iran's determination. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- --
Doctor Asad: Treat, Don't Condemn, the Illness
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (S) A confident President Asad greeted the six visiting senators and accompanying staff of CODEL Gregg on December 30
with a call for frank discussion of "the facts" rather than an exchange of opinions. Only the facts, he said, would
enable both sides to focus on the critical issues of common interest and lead to a process of identifying solutions to
shared challenges. The international community had failed for two decades to solve the region's problems. Now, there
were new challenges on top of these that required direct, not diplomatic, solutions. He welcomed the delegation, saying he
hoped for more meetings with Congressional groups.
¶3. (S) Senator Specter expressed the delegation's ondolences after the death of the President's younger
brother Majd and recalled his numerous meetings with President Asad since their first meeting in 2000 at the
funeral of former Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. Senator Specter referred to his earlier discussions with Syrian
officials about Israeli-Syrian peace talks and suggested
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Israel would benefit from peace with Syria. The U.S. recognized Syria's deep and long-standing ties to Iran, but
it also saw dangers if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.
Stipulating that the Israeli government would have to make its own decisions on how to proceed in peace talks with Syria
without U.S. pressure, Specter suggested the U.S. would positively view Syrian efforts to use its influence to alter
Iranian policies. Iranian policies currently opposed the achievement of peace between Syria and Israel, even as Syria
recognized such a development would have a positive impact on defusing other regional tensions.
¶4. (S) Asad asserted he wanted peace with Israel, but the issues were complex and required an organized frame of
reference. Both sides might agree on the shared objective of peace, but they differed on preferred approaches. Calling
for a fact-based approach to identifying the obstacles to peace, Asad likened the process to how a doctor should treat
cancer. Condemnations and mutual recriminations might be self-satisfying, but the cancer still grows unless the doctor
is able to treat the root illness. Syria, Asad continued, had begun indirect peace talks with Israel in May 2008 under
Turkish auspices. In roughly eight months, these talks had achieved more than several years of direct negotiations with
Israel in the 1990s. The U.S. and Europeans needed to support the Turkish track, argued Asad. They also should
convince Israel that only peace will protect Israel.
Israel's military superiority would not secure it from attack against missiles and other technologies. President Obama's
tenure might represent the last opportunity for peace, Asad told the senators.
-----------------------------------------
Asad on Necessity of Indirect Peace Talks
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (S) Senator Gregg asked why Syria insisted on pursuing indirect peace talks via the Turks. Why couldn't Syria and
Israel move to direct talks brokered by the U.S., while Syria helped on issues important to the U.S., such as Hizballah,
Hamas, and relations with Iran? Asad replied Hamas and Hizballah should be a part of the peace, but not organizing
principles for conducting peace discussions. Syria, as demonstrated by then-lead negotiator Muallim's efforts in the
1990s, had no problems with direct negotiations. But those negotiations failed; failing again might foreclose future
opportunities. U.S. ambitions to push the peace process forward only resulted in spoiling the process because of the
lack of "rules of negotiation." Indirect talks represent the best way to establish terms of reference similar to those
reached by Secretary Baker during his intense shuttle diplomacy in 1991. While no one called these talks indirect
negotiations, they functioned comparably to Syria's indirect talks under Turkish auspices.
¶6. (S) Syria, Asad continued, saw the indirect talks as a way to institutionalize the process and reach agreed terms of
reference on which to base direct negotiations. This basis was absent in the 1990s and explained why the direct
negotiations ultimately failed. Referring to the "elephant in the room," Gregg asked whether it would be possible to
reach peace with Israel without first resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. Asad cautioned against linking Iran's nuclear
program to an Israeli-Syrian peace deal, arguing such a link would only complicate both sets of issues. "Too many cooks
spoil the meal," he said. Later in the conversation, however (in the context of a request for Syrian intervention with
Iran to free detained American hikers), Asad noted every person and nation was key in bilateral and regional dynamics.
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Syria had cut relations with the U.S. after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, but bilateral relations had improved
markedly after President Nixon visited Syria in 1974 to discuss peace with Israel. "That's our issue," he stressed,
noting that the Golan track had been active under President Carter but then dormant through most of the 1980s and the
early part of the current decade.
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Iraq: Political Cooperation, Then Security Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶7. (S) Senator Bayh observed that many things in Syria had changed for the better since his 2002 visit. Now, there were
positive indicators that bilateral relations might be on the upswing as well. One area, however, in which relations had
not improved was intelligence cooperation. The U.S. and Syria appeared to have common interests in seeing a stable
Iraq, not dominated by Iran. Yet, foreign extremists continued to travel through Syria into Iraq. The U.S. had
provided information regarding four named individuals to the Syrian government, but nothing had happened. Perhaps now was
a propitious moment to consider re-establishing intelligence ties, Bayh suggested. Asad concurred with the idea of
overlapping U.S.-Syrian interests in Iraq. He noted, however, that the main obstacle to increased U.S.-Syrian
security cooperation stemmed from the absence of political cooperation. The U.S. possessed a "huge information
apparatus" but lacked the ability to analyze this information successfully, maintained Asad. "You're failing in the fight
against extremism. While we lack your intelligence capabilities, we succeed in fighting extremists because we
have better analysts," he claimed, attributing the superior analysis to living in and understanding the region.
¶8. (S) Syria, Asad explained, had refused to cooperate with President Bush because it did not trust him and because the
Bush Administration had wrongfully accused Syria of supporting foreign fighters. When President Obama assumed
office, Syria tried to be positive. Asad he had proposed to Special Envoy Mitchell the idea of a border security
cooperation initiative with Iraq as a first step. (Post Comment: Asad's recollection is both selective and inaccurate. U.S. officials first proposed a border security cooperation initiative to a reluctant FM Muallim in May 2009.
President Asad agreed to participate after meeting S/E Mitchell in late July 2009.) "This was a small step for me, but big for you," Asad argued. Citing the U.S. inability to control its long border with Mexico, Asad said the border was not the major challenge. Syria's close intelligence cooperation with Turkey enabled both countries to prevent terrorists from crossing their 860-kilometer border without relying on a huge border security presence. This intelligence cooperation enabled Syria to "suffocate"
logistical networks critical to the movement of terrorists. "In the U.S., you like to shoot (terrorists). Suffocating
their networks is far more effective," said Asad.
¶9. (S) Asad said Syria required a positive first step prior to resuming intelligence cooperation, a position that Senator
Mitchell had accepted. Syria had succeeded in convincing Iraqi PM Maliki on August 18 to reverse its opposition to the
trilateral border security initiative and was ready to participate. After the August 19 bombings and Iraqi accusations against Syria for facilitating the terrorist attacks, Syria remained willing to participate in the border assessments. It was the U.S., Asad insisted, that had backed away. Syria had no interest in supporting extremists, who weren't killing Americans but rather Iraqi civilians. "That
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hurts us," Asad claimed. U.S. "mistakes in Iraq" had cost Syria and the region a great deal. Syria had out of
self-interest sought to deter terrorists who popped up. Still, despite a shared interest with the U.S. in ensuring
Iraqi stability, Syria would not immediately jump to intelligence cooperation without ensuring its own interests
would be respected. "I won't give it (intelligence cooperation) to you for free," he said. Senator Bayh replied
that the U.S. was working to normalize relations and considering positive steps to take along the way. Syria,
Asad commented, had been clear on how to start rebuilding relations. "We didn't say no," he said, "but we have to
build from an absence of trust."
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Asad: Door Open to Iranian Nuclear Deal
----------------------------------------
¶10. (S) Senator Cornyn commented the most dire threat to regional peace stemmed from Iran's nuclear aspirations.
Syrian interests could well suffer if there were a conflict between Israel and Iran and possibly others. Asad replied no
one could predict the course of a conflict; therefore, it was better to avoid one. The Bush Administration took a
political approach to Iran instead of dealing with the nuclear issue in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Under the NPT, Iran enjoys the right to enrich uranium, provided there is IAEA monitoring. Instead of trying to stop
Iran's program, the international emphasis should shift to ensuring proper monitoring. Iran had accepted the principle
of enriching uranium outside of its borders. Now the challenge was how to meet Iran's concern that shipping all of
its LEU at once would risk not receiving any in return. Asad claimed Iran sought only to enrich its uranium to 20 percent,
well bellow the 95 percent threshold necessary for weapons-grade material. If the international community
agreed to divide Iran's shipments into four or five parts, Iran would be flexible, Asad argued. In the meantime, Israel
had to forget about attacking Iran. Such a move would only encourage Iran to follow the path of India, Pakistan, and
others in seeking a nuclear weapon. Syria opposed this outcome, but viewed the only solution was to recognize Iran's
rights and demonstrate flexibility in foreign enrichment, Asad said.
¶11. (S) Later in the conversation, Senator Specter argued Iran appeared to be blocking a deal. Asad claimed Iranian
diplomacy was now more flexible because the government was stronger and more confident after the 2009 elections. Noting
he had shared this assessment with French President Sarkozy, Asad said he judged Iran to be looking for cooperative signs.
Iran represented the most important country in the region, Asad assessed, ranking Turkey second and Syria third. The
U.S. had troops in Afghanistan and needed better relations with Iran. Specter agreed the enrichment issue could be
solved; Russia had offered to enrich Iranian uranium several years ago, subject to international monitoring. Iran had
answered yes, replied Asad, but the issue was how to proceed.
Iran's desire to divide the uranium shipments represented the only difference: if the West agreed, the issue would be
solved. There was an open door; if the nuclear issue could be solved, the peace process would proceed more easily. But
if conflict erupted, the regional context would become extremely complicated.
------------------------------------
Discussion of Detained Amcits in Iran
-------------------------------------
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¶12. (S) Senator Klobuchar commented that she had supported Barak Obama because of his promise to advance a new approach to international relations. While there were no easy solutions in the region, the U.S. and Syria appeared to have
overlapping interests in avoiding war and in ensuring a strong and stable Iraq. From the U.S. perspective, Syria
might demonstrate as a goodwill gesture its interest in better relations by helping obtain the release of three American citizens -- Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer and Sarah Shourd -- who apparrently crossed into Iran while hiking in northeastern Iraq. Swiss officials had visited them, but they were isolated and the U.S. lacked information on their whereabouts and any pending charges.
¶13. (S) Asad replied he was unfamiliar with their case and requested that the Embassy send more information. Senator
Specter interjected later in the conversation that the Embassy had delivered a letter to the MFA that week from the
Secretary. Specter added he had personally raised the matter in Washington with Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa. The U.S.
would view positively Syrian efforts to secure the three Americans' release, Specter said, comparing the case to the
Iranian detention of UK sailors whom Syria helped to free.
"We'll try our best," replied Asad, saying it would be necessary to ask about the legal aspects of the case.
Specter clarified there had been no charges filed. It had started as a trespassing case, but U.S.-Iranian relations
were so poor it was impossible to resolve.
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Re-Opening DCS: Syria Awaiting U.S. Steps First
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶13. (S) Senator Klobuchar and Senator Enzi argued Syria might demonstrate good will by re-opening the Damascus
Community School (DCS), whose closure had hurt not just American students, but also many foreigners and Syrians.
Senator Enzi said his committee's purview on education created a personal interest in seeing the DCS re-opened; the
school's closure represented a step away from moving towards positive relations. Asad replied he wanted to open Syria to
the rest of the world. In September 2008, for example, the French Embassy opened a new international school. Asad
explained he had ordered DCS's closure after a U.S. military attack on Syrian soil had killed seven innocent civilians in
late October 2008. "We had to respond," he argued, saying the school's closure "was the only step we could take" in
response to the Bush Administration. President Carter, Asad continued, had urged the reopening of DCS during his December
2008 visit. "I told Carter that we are ready," said Asad, who noted the Syrian government wanted to send positive
signals to the Obama administration and had done so by re-opening the American Cultural Center (ACC).
¶14. (S) FM Muallim noted that only part of the American Language Center portion of ACC had been allowed to re-open.
He argued that he and other Syrian officials had told State Department officials that steps by Syria to improve relations
first required U.S. steps. "We can't move without a waiver for Syrian Airlines," he argued, citing the threat to Syrian
civilians posed a U.S. ban on the sale of civilian aircraft and spare parts. Asad noted that a good friend who ran a
medical laboratory was similarly unable to import U.S. lab technology. The bigger issue, Asad said, was about bilateral
relations. Syria's intent was to re-open the DCS. Asad said he trusted President Carter and supported President Obama.
"We know he has other problems and priorities, but there must be U.S. steps," Asad insisted.
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¶15. © U.S. Participants:
CDA Charles Hunter
Senator Judd Gregg
Senator Evan Bayh
Senator Arlen Specter
Senator Michael Enzi
Senator John Cornyn
Senator Amy Klobuchar
Mr. Paul Grove, Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee
Mr. Christopher Gahan, Staff Member, Senator Gregg's Office
Mr. Michael Pevzner, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
Mr. Tom Sullivan, Staff Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
Mr. Christopher Bradish, Staff Member, Senator Specter's
Office
¶16. © Syrian Participants:
President Bashar al-Asad
Foreign Minister Walid Muallim
Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad
Presidential Advisor for Media and Policy Affairs Bouthaina
Shaaban
MFA America's Desk Director Dr. Muhammad Khafif
¶17. (SBU) Mr. Paul Grove of CODEL Gregg cleared on this
cable.
HUNTER
كامل نص الرقية السرية : محضر الجلسة
محاضر جلسات لو تمت ترجمتها تصبح وكأنك جالس بينهم
غالبا بوجود 3 سوريين آخرين فبشار الأسد سيكون حريص ....الأسرار والكلام الخطير يتم بالاجتماعات المغلقة الثنائية كاجتماع الأسد مع ملك عبد الله مثلا
بحث
قائمة الأعضاء
التقويم
وثائق المساعدة
/
ويكيليكس: محضر سري لاجتماع الرئيس السوري مع وفد الكونغرس الاميركي
وبينما حصل عدد من الصحف المتعاونة مع «ويكيليكس» على كل الوثائق مسبقا، فإن نشر الوثائق نفسها سيستمر تدريجيا على الموقع خلال الأشهر المقبلة، مما يعني إحراجا متواصلا للولايات المتحدة. ولكن تعرض موقع «ويكيليكس» لعدد من «الهجمات» الإلكترونية أمس، مما بطأ عملية نشر الوثائق، وينذر بإمكانية شل الموقع مستقبلا في حال نجحت تلك الهجمات.
