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الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-10-2006
UNGA Resolution on Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on
the Legality of the Nuclear Weapons
[CENTER]
December 10, 1996
Recalling its resolution 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, in which it requested the
International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on whether the threat or
use of nuclear weapons is permitted in any circumstances under international law,
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
Recalling its resolution 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, in which it called upon the
Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear
disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear
disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound
framework,
Recalling also the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the
objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of
eliminating those weapons,
Recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total
elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced
again,
Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and
their destruction under effective international control,
Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total
elimination of nuclear weapons and welcoming every effort towards this end,
Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum,
Noting the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the General
Assembly in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996,
Regretting the absence of multilaterally negotiated and legally binding security
assurances from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
states,
Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all
humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on
Earth.
1. Expresses its appreciation to the International Court of Justice for responding to the
request made by the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;
2. Takes note of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996 (A/51/218);
3. Underlines the unanimous conclusion of the Court that "There exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control";
4. Calls upon all States to fulfil that obligation immediately by commencing
multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons
convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling,
transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide necessary assistance to support the
implementation of the present resolution;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session an item
entitled "Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion on the International Court of Justice on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons."
Sponsors:
Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lesotho,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mexico,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.
[/CENTER]
الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
الأمان النووي
[CENTER]
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak
of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR
The very existence of nuclear-weapon systems, even under the most sophisticated
command-and-control procedures, obviously is a source of constant concern. Despite
the most elaborate precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction or human
failure, a misinterpreted incident or unauthorized action, could trigger a nuclear
disaster or nuclear war. In the course of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT),
the United States and the Soviet Union reached two agreements that manifest
increasing recognition of the need to reduce such risks, and that complement the
central goal of the negotiations.
In early sessions, discussions parallel to the main SALT negotiations showed a degree
of mutual concern regarding the problem of accidental war that indicated encouraging
prospects of accord. These preliminary explorations resulted in the establishment of
two special working groups under the direction of the two SALT delegations. One
group focused on arrangements for exchanging information to reduce uncertainties
and prevent misunderstandings in the event of a nuclear incident. The other addressed
a related topic -- ways to improve the direct communications link between
Washington and Moscow. By the summer of 1971, major substantive issues had been
resolved, and draft international agreements were referred by the SALT delegations to
their governments. Both agreements were signed in Washington on September 30,
1971, and came into force on that date.
The Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
covers three main areas:
• A pledge by each party to take measures each considers necessary to maintain
and improve its organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
• Arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise
from such incidents, from detection of unidentified objects on early warning
systems, or from any accidental, unauthorized, or other unexplained incident
involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and
• Advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of
the launching party and in the direction of the other party.
The agreement provides that for urgent communication "in situations requiring
prompt clarification" the "Hot Line" will be used. The duration of the agreement is
not limited, and the parties undertake to consult on questions that may arise and to
discuss possible amendments aimed at further reduction of risks.
AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF
NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Signed at Washington September 30, 1971
Entered into force September 30, 1971
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties:
Taking into account the devastating consequences that nuclear war would have for all
mankind, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to avert the risk of outbreak
of such a war, including measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of
nuclear weapons,
Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war
serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, and is in no way
contrary to the interests of any other country,
Bearing in mind that continued efforts are also needed in the future to seek ways of
reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes to maintain and to improve, as it deems necessary, its existing
organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control.
Article 2
The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental,
unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a
nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the event of
such an incident, the Party whose nuclear weapon is involved will immediately make
every effort to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy such weapon
without its causing damage.
Article 3
The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of detection by
missile warning systems of unidentified objects, or in the event of signs of
interference with these systems or with related communications facilities, if such
occurrences could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries.
Article 4
Each Party undertakes to notify the other Party in advance of any planned missile
launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of
the other Party.
Article 5
Each Party, in other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents, undertakes to
act in sucha manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by
the other Party. In any such situation, each Party may inform the other Party or
request information when in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the
risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
Article 6
For transmission of urgent information, notifications and requests for information in
situations requiring prompt clarification, the Parties shall make primary use of the
Direct Communications Link between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
For transmission of other information, notification and requests for information, the
Parties, at their own discretion, may use any communications facilities, including
diplomatic channels, depending on the degree of urgency.
Article 7
The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions
relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss
possible amendments thereto aimed at further implementation of the purposes of this
Agreement.
Article 8
This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.
Article 9
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.
DONE at Washington on September 30, 1971, in two copies, each in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
A. GROMYKO
[/CENTER]
الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[[CENTER]COLOR=Blue]Commission Regulation (EURATOM)
No 3227/76 Concerning the Application of the Provisions on
EURATOM Safeguards
[19 October 1976][/COLOR]
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,
and in particular Articles 77, 78, 79 and 81 thereof,
Having regard to the approval of the Council,
Whereas Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community Regulation No. 7
established the implementing procedures for the declarations required by Article 78 of
the Treaty.
Whereas the Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community Regulation
No. 8 defined the nature and the extent of the requirements referred to in Article 79 of
the Treaty;
Whereas, in view of the increasing quantities of nuclear materials produced, used and
carried in the Community and development of trade in these materials, it is essential,
in order to ensure the effectiveness of safeguards, that the nature and the extent of the
requirements referred to in Article 79 of the Treaty and laid out in Regulation No. 8
referred to above, be defined and brought up to date in the light of experience
particularly with regard to the transportation of, or commerce in these materials;
Whereas, moreover, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom on Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
concluded on 5 April 1973 an Agreement (hereinafter called the Agreement') with the
national Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article 111 (1) and (4) of the
Treaty on the non?proliferation of nuclear weapons;
Whereas the Agreement contains a particular undertaking entered into by the
Community concerning the application of safeguards on source and special fissile
materials on the territories of the Community Member States which have no nuclear
weapons of their own and which are parties to the Treaty on the Non?Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and, in conjunction with the Community, to the Agreement signed
on 5 April 1973 with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter called 'the
Member States party to the Agreement');
Whereas the implementation of this undertaking requires the establishment of
particular procedures for the application of safeguards on the territories of the
Member States party to the Agreement in order to amplify the provisions of the
aforementioned Regulations No 7 and No 8 ;
Whereas, moreover, the procedures foreseen by this Agreement are in conformity
with those devised in the course of a very wide?ranging international negotiation
conducted, in view of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III of the Treaty
on the non?proliferation of nuclear weapons, with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the result of which has been approved by the Board of Governors of that
organization, and that these procedures are based on the most modem developments
in the field of safeguards;
Whereas, accordingly, it is opportune to define new procedures for the application of
the provisions of Chapter VII of the Treaty;
Whereas the Community, the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy
Agency have signed on 6 September 1976 an Agreement comprising a particular
commitment which concerns the application of safeguards to source and special fissile
materials on the territory of the United Kingdom;
Whereas it is appropriate to arrange for particular provisions relative to the accounting
system and the presentation of records concerning ores;
Whereas, on the territories of the Member States not party to the Agreement, some
installations or parts thereof as well as certain materials are liable to be involved in
the production cycle for defence needs, therefore it is appropriate to specify particular
safeguard procedures to take account of these circumstances;
Whereas, for clarity's sake, and particularly to make the respect of safeguard
Regulations easier for those concerned, it is appropriate to codify these Regulations in
a single text,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
PART I
BASIC TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTICULAR SAFEGUARDS
PROVISIONS DECLARATION OF THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Article 1
Any person or undertaking setting up or operating an installation for the production,
separation or other use of source materials or special fissile materials or for the
processing of irradiated nuclear fuels shall declare to the Commission the basic
technical characteristics of the installation, on the basis of the relevant questionnaire
given in Annex I hereto.
Any person or undertaking responsible for the storage of source materials or special
fissile materials shall be subject to the provisions of the first paragraph.
Article 2
Where the basic technical characteristics of an installation have already been
communicated to the Commission, the declarations specified in the said Article I may
be made by reference to such earlier communication, provided that any additional
information required by the questionnaire referred to in Article I is supplied within 30
days from the date on which this Regulation comes into force.
The basic technical characteristics of new installations shall be declared as laid down
in Article I at least 45 days before the first consignment of nuclear material is due to
be received.
Article 3
This 'particular safeguard provision' referred to in Article 7 shall specify those
important changes in the basic technical characteristics for which advance notification
is required.
Any other changes in the basic technical characteristics shall be communicated to the
Commission, together with the first inventory change report made after the
modification is complete.
Article 4
On receipt of a reasoned request, the Commission may allow additional time for the
completion of the declarations required in the preceding Articles.
Article 5
The provisions of Article I shall not apply to persons or undertakings holding only
nuclear materials exempted from the declaration requirements as provided for by
Article 22.
PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES
Article 6
The persons or undertakings referred to in Article I shall also communicate to the
Commission, for the planning of its safeguard activities, the following information:
(a) annually, an outline programme of activities drawn up in accordance with the
'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7, the first communication being
made on the basis of the guidelines given in Annex X, at the same time as that of the
basic technical characteristics referred to in Article 1;
(b) at least 40 days before beginning the taking of a physical inventory, the
programme for such work;
© at least 40 days before starting to shut down a batch?loaded reactor for reloading,
the programme in respect of such shutting down unless otherwise provided in the
'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7.
Any change affecting programmes for the taking of physical inventories or for the
shutting down of reactors to reload shall be communicated to the Commission without
delay.
PARTICULAR SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS
Article 7
Acting on the declarations of basic technical characteristics and on the information
communicated in pursuance of Article 6, the Commission shall specify in the
'particular safeguard provisions' the procedures by which the persons or undertakings
concerned shall meet the requirements in relation to safeguards imposed on them.
Among others these procedures shall include:
(a) the designation of the material balance areas and the selection of those strategic
points which are key measurement points for determining the flow and stocks of
nuclear materials;
(b) the procedures for keeping records of nuclear materials for each material balance
area and for drawing up reports;
© the frequency of and procedures for drawing up physical inventories for
accounting?purposes as part of safeguard measures;
(d) containment and surveillance measures, in accordance with the modalities agreed
upon with the plant operators;
(e) sample?taking by the plant operator solely for safeguard purposes.
The particular safeguard provisions' shall also lay down the content of subsequent
communications required under Article 6 of this Regulation as well as the conditions
requiring advance notification of shipments and receipts of nuclear material.
The Commission will reimburse the person or undertaking concerned the cost of those
special services which are provided for in the 'particular safeguard provisions' or
which are provided because of a special request of the Commission or of the
inspectors and on the basis of an agreed estimate. The extent and modality of the
reimbursement will be fixed between the parties concerned and will be reviewed
periodically as necessary.
Article 8
The particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7 shall be drawn up by
means of an individual decision of the Commission after consultation with the person
or undertaking concerned and the appropriate Member State.
The person or undertaking affected by any individual decision of the Commission will
be notified thereof, and a copy of such notification will be transmitted to the Member
State concerned.
PART II
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
Article 9
The persons and undertakings referred to in Article I shall maintain a system of
accounting for and control of nuclear materials. This system shall include accounting
and operating records and, in particular, information on the quantities, nature, form
and composition of these materials in accordance with the requirements of Article 2 1,
their actual location, the particular safeguarding obligation, and the way in which the
persons or undertakings concerned have stated that they intend to use such materials,
in accordance with their own decisions, as well as the shipper or recipient when
materials are transferred.
The system of measurements on which the records are based shall comply with the
most recent international standards or shall be equivalent in quality to those standards.
On the basis of these records it must be possible to establish and justify the
communications addressed to the Commission in the form and at the intervals laid
down in Articles 12 to 2 1. Records shall be retained for a period of at least five years.
ACCOUNTING RECORDS
Article 10
The accounting records shall show in respect of each material balance area:
(a) all inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any
(b) all measurement and counting results that are used for determination of the
physical inventory;
© all corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book
inventories and physical inventories.
For all inventory changes and physical inventories the accounting records shall show,
in respect of each batch of nuclear material, material identification, batch data and
source data. These records shall account separately for uranium, thorium. and
plutonium in each batch of nuclear material. Moreover for each inventory change, the
date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the dispatching material balance
area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated.
OPERATING RECORDS
Article 11
The operating records shall include, if appropriate, for each material balance area:
(a) those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and
composition of the nuclear material;
(b) the data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling
and analysis, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived
estimates of random and systematic error;
© a description of the sequence of actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a
physical inventory in order to ensure that it is correct and complete;
(d) a description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of
any accidental or unmeasured loss that might have occurred.
ACCOUNTING AND SPECIAL REPORTS
Article 12
The persons and undertakings referred to in Article I shall provide the Commission
with accounting reports and, when appropriate, with special reports.
The accounting reports shall set forth the information available on the date of
reporting and must be corrected at a later date if necessary.
On a reasoned request by the Commission, further details or explanations in
connection with these reports shall be supplied normally within three weeks of that
request.
Initial inventory
Article 13
The persons and undertakings referred to in Article 1 shall transmit to the
Commission an initial book inventory of all nuclear materials which for any reason
they have in their possession within 15 days of the last day of the month in which this
Regulation comes into force. This inventory shall describe the situation on the last day
of that month. The form set out in Annex IV to this Regulation shall be used for this
purpose.
Inventory change report
Article 14
For each material balance area, the persons and undertakings referred to in Article I
shall transmit to the Commission inventory change reports in respect of all nuclear
materials in accordance with the specimen set out in Annex II. The reports shall
identify the materials and give batch data for each batch thereof, the dispatching
material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient.
The reports concerning transfers shall also indicate for receipts the intended use,
pursuant to Article 9, and for dispatches the use made of the nuclear materials in the
reporting installation. Unless otherwise defined in the 'particular safeguard provisions'
referred to in Article 7, no declaration of use is mandatory for transfers between
different material balance areas of the same installation.
These reports showing inventory changes, book inventories and corrections shall be
sent as soon as possible and, in any case, within 15 days after the end of the month in
which the inventory changes occur are known, either periodically in a consolidated
list or individually. For months in which no inventory changes occur, the persons or
undertakings concerned may simply send in the form intended for the inventory
change report carrying the indication that the situation remained unchanged. Small
inventory changes, such as transfers of samples for purposes of analysis, may be
grouped, as laid down in the 'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7
for the installation concerned, in order that they may be reported as a single inventory
change.
Article 15
The reports referred to in Article 14 shall be accompanied by concise notes:
(a) explaining the inventory changes on the basis of the operating data contained in
the operating records provided for in Article 11 (a) of this Regulation;
(b) describing as specified in the 'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article
7, the planned operational programme for the installation concerned and, in particular,
the taking of a physical inventory.
If the required information is contained in documents which already exist, copies of
such documents may take the place of the concise notes.
Material balance report and physical inventory listing
Article 16
For each material balance area, the persons and undertakings referred to in Article 1
shall transmit to the Commission, in accordance with the specimen set out in Annex
III to this Regulation, material balance reports showing:
(a) beginning physical inventory;
(b) inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);
© ending book inventory;
(d) ending physical inventory;
(e) material unaccounted for
A physical inventory, in accordance with the specimen set out in Annex IV, listing all
batches separately giving, inter alia, identification of the materials and giving batch
data for each batch thereof and the use, pursuant to Article 9, which the persons or
undertakings concerned intend to make of the materials, shall be attached to each
material balance report.
These reports shall be transmitted as soon as possible and in any case within 30 days
from the date on which a physical inventory was taken, unless otherwise specified in
the 'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7
Special reports
Article 17
The persons and undertakings referred to in Article 1 shall transmit to the
Commission a special report whenever the circumstances mentioned in Articles 18
and 27 arise.
The type of information to be dealt with in such reports shall be specified in the
'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7.
The special reports and further details or explanations which may be requested by the
Commission in connection with these reports shall be supplied without delay.
Article 18
A special report must be made without delay:
(a) if, as a result of any unusual incident or circumstances, it is believed that there has
been or might be a loss of nuclear material in excess of the limits specified for these
purposes in the particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7; or
(b) if the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the 'particular
safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7, to a point where an unauthorized
removal of nuclear material has become possible.
The above mentioned obligations shall devolve upon the persons and undertakings
concerned as soon as they have become aware of any such loss or sudden change in
the containment conditions, or of anything which leads them to believe that there has
been such an occurrence. The causes shall also be stated as soon as they are known.
Detailed rules of application
Article 19
In respect of reactors, the obligations laid down in Articles 10 to 16 shall apply under
the following conditions.
As far as nuclear transformations are concerned, calculated data will be reported in
the inventory change report at the latest when irradiated fuel is transferred from the
reactor material balance area. In addition, where appropriate, other procedures for
recording and reporting nuclear transformations shall be specified in the 'particular
safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7.
Article 20
Nuclear materials subject to particular safeguard obligations entered into by the
Community in an Agreement concluded with a non?Member State or an international
organization shall, unless otherwise stipulated by such Agreement, be identified
separately for each obligation in the following notifications:
(a) initial book inventory (Article 13);
(b) inventory change reports, but excluding book inventories (Article 14);
© physical inventory listings (Article 16); and
(d) intended imports and exports (Articles 24 and 25).
Unless specifically prohibited in the Agreement referred to above, such separation
shall not preclude the physical mixing of materials.
This Article shall not apply to the Agreement or to any other Agreement concluded by
the Community and a Member State with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Article 21
(a) In any notification referred to in this Regulation, quantities of source materials
shall be expressed in kilogramines and quantities of special fissile materials in
grammes.
(b) The corresponding material accounting records shall be kept in the units referred
to in (a) of this Article or in smaller units. They shall be kept in such a manner as to
render them trustworthy and, in particular, to comply with current practices in the
Member States.
© In the notifications provided for above, quantities may be rounded down to the
nearest unit when the first decimal is 0 to 4 and rounded up when the first decimal is 5
to 9.
(d) Unless otherwise provided for in the 'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in
Article 7:
(i) notifications shall indicate the total weight of the elements contained. uranium,
thoriurn or plutonium and also, for enriched uranium, the total weight of the fissile
isotopes. The isotopic composition of plutonium, if recorded at the installation for
operational needs, shall be made available to the Commission on request;
(ii) separate line entries in inventory change reports and in physical inventory listings
and separate material balance reports must be used for the following categories of
nuclear material:
· depleted uranium,
· natural uranium,
· uranium enriched up to 20%
· uranium enriched above 20%
· plutonium,
· thorium
Derogations and Exemptions
Article 22
(a) In order to take account of any particular circumstances in which safeguarded
materials are used or produced, the Commission may, in the 'particular safeguard
provisions' referred to in Article 7, grant producers and users of nuclear materials a
derogation from the rules governing the form and frequency of notification provided
for in this Regulation.
The Commission may so decide especially in the case of installations holding only
small quantities which are kept in the same state for long periods.
(b) At the request of the persons or undertakings concerned in accordance with the
form set out in Annex VIII, the Commission may exempt the following materials
from declaration, provided that they are not processed or stored together with
non?exempted nuclear materials:
· special fissile materials which are used in quantities of the order of a gramme or less
as sensing components in instruments,
· plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium?238 in excess of 80%,
· nuclear materials which are used exclusively in non?nuclear activities.
If the conditions for exemption cease to be fulfilled, the exemptions shall be
rescinded. The person or undertaking concerned shall inform the Commission in
accordance with the form set out in Annex IX that the conditions for exemption no
longer exist.
Article 23
This Regulation shall not apply to holders of finished products used for non?nuclear
purposes which incorporate
nuclear materials that are virtually irrecoverable.
PART III
TRANSFERS: IMPORTS/EXPORTS
Article 24
(a) The persons and undertakings referred to in Article 1 which export source or
special fissile materials to a non?Member State shall give advance notification to the
Commission of every such export. Similarly, advance notification shall be given to
the Commission:
· in the case of any export from a Member State party to the Agreement to a Member
State not party to the Agreement, and
· in the case of any export from the United Kingdom to a Member State party to the
Agreement.
However, advance notification is required only:
(i) where the consignment exceeds one effective kilogramme;
(ii) where the 'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7 so specify, in
the case of installations habitually transferring large total quantities of materials to the
same State, even though no single consignment exceeds one effective kilogramme.
(b) Such notification shall be given after the conclusion of the contractual
arrangements leading to the transfer and in any case in time to reach the Commission
eight working days before the material is to be prepared f . or shipment.
© Such notification shall be given in accordance with the form set out in Annex V to
this Regulation and shall state, inter alia,
· the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the
material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will come,
· the State to which the nuclear material is to be sent,
· the dates on and locations at which the nuclear material will be prepared for
shipment,
· the approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material,
· the use which the persons or undertakings concerned had made of the nuclear
material.
(d) If so required for reasons of physical protection, special arrangements concerning
the form and transmission of such notification may be agreed upon with the
Commission.
Article 25
(a) The persons and undertakings referred to in Article 1 which import source or
special fissile materials from a non?member State shall give advance notification to
the Commission of every such import. Similarly, advance notification shall be given
to the Commission:
· in the case of any import into a Member State party to the Agreement from a
Member State not party to the Agreement, and
· in the case of any import into the United Kingdom from a Member State party to the
Agreement.
However, advance notification is required only:
(i) where the consignment exceeds one effective kilogramme;
(ii) where the 'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7 so specify, in
the case of installations to which large total quantities of materials are habitually
transferred from the same State, even though no single consignment exceeds one
effective kilogramme.
(b) Such notification shall be given as far in advance as possible of the expected
arrival of the nuclear material and, in any case, on the date of receipt and in time to
reach the Commission five working days before the material is unpacked.
© Such notification shall be given in accordance with the form set out in Annex VI
and shall state, inter alia:
· the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the
material,
· the expected date of arrival, the location where and the date on which the nuclear
material is expected to be unpacked.
(d) If so required for reasons of physical protection, special arrangements concerning
the form and transmission of such notification may be greed upon with the
Commission.
Article 26
When persons or undertakings not subject to Article 1 decide to export or import
nuclear materials referred to in Articles 24 and 25, these persons or undertakings are
required to make the notifications foreseen in Articles 24 and 25.
Article 27
A special report as provided for in Article 17 shall be prepared by the persons or
undertakings covered by Articles 24 and 25 if, following exceptional circumstances or
an incident, they have received information that nuclear materials have been or appear
to be lost, particularly when there has been a considerable delay during transfer. In the
same circumstances persons or undertakings covered by Article 26 are also required
to inform the Commission.
Article 28
Any change of date in the preparation for shipment, in the shipment or in the
unpacking of nuclear materials with respect to the dates given in the notifications
provided for in Articles 24 and 25, but not a change that gives rise to special reports,
shall be communicated without delay, with an indication of the revised dates, if
known.
PART IV
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
Ore Producers
Article 29
Any person or undertaking extracting ores on the territory of a Member State shall
keep accounting records thereof. These records must indicate, in particular, the
tonnage and average uranium and thorium content of the ore extracted and of the
stock at the mine, and proof of shipment, stating the date, consignee, and quantity.
Such records shall be kept for at least five years.
Article 30
No later than the end of January each year, producers of ores shall inform the
Commission, in accordance with the form set out in Annex VII, of the amount of
material dispatched from each mine during the previous year.
Article 31
Any person or undertaking exporting ores to non?Member States shall inform the
Commission thereof, in accordance with the form set out in Annex VIL on the actual
date of dispatch.
Carriers
Article 32
Any person or undertaking engaged, within the territories of the Member States, in
carrying or temporarily storing source or special fissile materials during shipment
may accept them or hand them over only against a duly signed and dated receipt. This
shall state the names of the parties handing over and receiving the materials and the
quantities carried, together with the nature, form and composition of the materials.
If so required for reasons of physical protection, the specification of the materials
transferred may be replaced by a suitable identification of the consignment. Such
identification shall be traceable to records held by the persons and undertakings
referred to in Article I and showing the specification mentioned.
Such documents shall be kept by the contracting parties for at least one year.
Article 33
Documents and papers already held and compiled by persons or undertakings in
accordance with existing regulations which apply to them on the territory of the
Member States in which they operate may take the place of the documents and
receipts provided for in Article 32, provided that such documents and papers contain
all the required information.
Intermediaries
Article 34
Every intermediary whatsoever, in particular authorized agents, brokers, commission
or business agents, taking part in the conclusion of any contract for the supply of
nuclear materials shall keep all documents relating to the transactions performed by
him or on his behalf for at least one year after the expiry of the contract. Such
documents shall mention the names of the contracting parties, the date of the contract,
the quantity, nature, form and composition together with the origin and destination of
the materials.
PART V
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS APPLICABLE IN THE TERRITORIES OF MEMBER
STATES WHICH ARE NUCLEAR?WEAPON STATES
Article 35
1. The provisions of this Regulation shall not apply:
(a) to installations or parts of installations which have been assigned to meet defence
requirements and which are situated on the territory of a Member State not party to
the Agreement; or
(b) to nuclear materials which have been assigned to meet defence requirements by
that Member State.
2. For nuclear materials, installations or parts of installations which are liable to be
assigned to meet defence requirements and which are situated on the territory of a
Member State not party to the Agreement, the extent of the application of this
Regulation and the procedures under it shall be defined by the Commission in
consultation and in agreement with the Member State concerned, taking into account
the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 84 of the Treaty.
3. It is understood in any event that:
(a) the provisions of Articles I to 4,7 and 8 shall apply to installations or parts of
installations which at certain times are operated exclusively with nuclear materials
liable to be assigned to meet defence requirements but at other times are operated
exclusively with civil nuclear materials;
(b) the provisions of Articles I to 4, 7 and 8 shall apply, with exceptions for reasons of
national security, to installations or parts of installations to which access could be
restricted for such reasons but which produce, treat, separate, reprocess or use in any
other way simultaneously both civil nuclear materials and nuclear materials assigned
or liable to be assigned to meet defence requirements;
© the provisions of Articles 6 and 9 to 37 shall apply in relation to all civil nuclear
materials situated in installations or parts of installations as referred to in
subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.
PART VI
FINALPROVISIONS
Definitions
Article 36
For the purposes of this Regulation:
(a) 'The Agreement' means the Agreement concluded on 5 April 1973 between the
Kingdom of Energy Community (Euratom) with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, in implementation of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III of the Treaty on the
non?proliferation of nuclear weapons.
(b) 'Member State Party to the Agreement' means the Kingdom of Belgium, the
Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian
Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
© 'Non?Member State' means any State which is not a member of the European
Atomic Energy Community.
(e) 'Special fissile materials' means plutonium?239; uranium?233; uranium enriched
in uranium?235 or uranium?233, and any substance containing one or more of the
foregoing isotopes and such other fissile materials as may be specified by the Council,
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission; the expression
'special fissile materials' does not, however, include source materials not ores or ore
waste.
(f) 'Uranium enriched in uranium?235 or uranium?233' means uranium containing
uranium?235 or uranium?233 or not in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the
sum of these isotopes to isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of isotope 235 to isotope
238 occurring in nature. 'Enrichment' means the ratio of combined weight or
uranium?233 and uranium?235 to the total weight of the uranium under consideration.
(g) 'Source materials' means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in
nature: uranium whose content in uranium?235 is less than the normal; thorium; any
of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy; chemical compound or concentrate; any
other substance containing one or more of the foregoing in such a concentration as
shall be specified by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission, and any other material which the Council may determine, acting by
a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. The words 'source materials'
shall not be taken to include ores or ore waste.
(h) 'Ores' means any ore containing, in such average concentration as shall be
specified by the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission, substances from which the source materials defined above may be
obtained by the appropriate chemical and physical processing.
(i) 'Nuclear materials' means any ore, source and special fissile material as defined in
paragraphs (e),(f),(g) and (h) above.
'Nature' of material means natural uranium depleted uranium, uranium enriched in
uranium?235 or uranium?233, thorium or plutonium, depending on the case.
(k) 'Batch' means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting
purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are
defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may
be in bulk form or contained in a number of identifiable items.
(l) 'Batch data' means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the
case of plutonium and uranium, the isotope composition when appropriate. For
reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together
before rounding to the nearest unit.
(m) 'Book inventory' of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most
recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes
that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken.
(n) 'Correction' means an entry in an accounting record or a report to rectify an
identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously
entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it
pertains.
(o) 'Effective kilogramine' means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material.
The quantity in effective kilogrammes is obtained by taking:
(i) for plutonium, its weight in kilogrammes;
(ii) for uranium with an enrichment of 0.0 1 (1 %) and above, its weight in
kilogramines multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
(iii) for uranium with an enrichment below 0.0 1 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its
weight in kilogramnies multiplied by 0.0001; and
(iv) for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for
thorium, its weight in kilogrammes multiplied by 0.00005.
(p) 'Inventory changes' means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear
material in a material balance area.
(q) 'Key measurement point' means location where nuclear material appears in such a
form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key
measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, inputs and outputs (including
measured discards) and storage in material balance areas.
® 'Material balance area' means an area such that:
(i) the quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance
area can be determined; and
(ii) the physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be
determined when necessary in accordance with specified procedures, in order that the
material balance may be established.
(s) 'Physical inventory' means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of
batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance
area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.
(u) 'Shipper/receiver difference' means the difference between the quantity of nuclear
material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at
the receiving material balance area.
(v) 'Source data' means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or
used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide
batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion
factors to determine weight of element, specify gravity, element concentration,
isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship
between plutonium produced and power generated.
(w) 'Strategic point' means a location selected during examination of design
information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information
from all 'strategic points' taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for
the implementation of safeguard measures under the Agreement is obtained and
verified; a 'strategic point' may include any location where key measurements related
to material accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures
are executed.
INSTALLATIONS CONTROLLED FROM
OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY
Article 37
Where an installation is controlled by a person or undertaking established outside the
Community, any obligations imposed by this Regulation shall devolve upon the local
management of the installation.
ANNEXES
Article 38
The Annexes to this Regulation [not printed] form an integral part thereof. The
Commission may make minor technical adjustments thereto.
ENTRY INTO FORCE
Article 39
This Regulation shall enter into force 15 days after its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Communities.
Without prejudice to Article 40, Commission of the European Atomic Energy
Community Regulations No. 7 and No. 8 are hereby repealed.
Article 40
Articles 9 to 16, 10 and 21 of this Regulation shall apply as from the adoption of the
'particular safeguard provisions' referred to in Article 7.
Until the adoption of those provisions, Articles 2, 5, 7, 8 and 10 of the above
mentioned Regulation No. 8 shall continue to apply.
[/CENTER]
الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[CENTER]Sec. 103: Commercial Licenses
a. Subsequent to a finding by the Commission as required in section 102, the
Commission may issue licenses to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,
manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, import, or ex-port under the terms of
an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123, such type of
utilization or production facility. Such licenses shall be issued in accordance with the
provisions of chapter 16 and subject to such conditions as the Commission may by
rule or regulation establish to effec-tuate the purposes and provisions of this Act.
b. The Commission shall issue such licenses on a nonexclusive basis to persons
applying therefore:
(1) whose proposed activities will serve a useful purpose proportionate to the
quantities of special nuclear material or source material to be utilized;
(2) who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe such safety standards to
protect health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by
rule establish; and
(3) who agree to make available to the Commission such technical information and
data concerning activities under such licenses as the Commission may deter-mine
necessary to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and
safety of the public. All such information may be used by the Commission only for
the purposes of the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety
of the public.
c. Each such license shall be issued for a specified period, as deter-mined by the
Commission, depending on the type of activity to be licensed, but not exceeding forty
years, and may be renewed upon the expiration of such period.
d. No license under this section may be given to any person for activi-ties which are
not under or within the jurisdiction of the United States, except for the export of
production or utilization facilities under terms of an agreement for cooperation
arranged pursuant to section 123, or except under the provisions of section 109. No
license may be issued to any corporation or other entity if the Commission knows or
has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign
corporation, or a foreign government. In any event, no license may be issued to any
person within the United States if in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a
license to such person would be inimical to the common defense and security or to the
health and safety of the public.
Chapter 16. Judicial Review and Administrative Procedure
Sec. 181: General
The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (Public Law 404, Seventy-ninth
Congress, approved June 11, 1946) shall apply to all agency action taken under this
Act, and the terms 'agency' and 'agency action'; shall have the meaning specified in
the Administrative Pro-cedure Act: Provided, however, that in the case of agency
proceedings or actions which involve Restricted Data or defense information, the
Com-mission shall provide by regulation for such parallel procedures as will effectively
safeguard and prevent disclosure of Restricted Data or defense information
to unauthorized persons with minimum impairment of the pro-cedural rights which
would be available if Restricted Data or defense infor-mation were not involved.
Sec. 182: License Applications
a. Each application for a license hereunder shall be in writing and shall specifically
state such information as the Commission, by rule or regulation, may determine to be
necessary to decide such of the technical and financial qualifications of the applicant,
the character of the applicant, the citizenship of the applicant, or any other
qualifications of the applicant as the Commis-sion may deem appropriate for the
license. In connection with applications for licenses to operate production or
utilization facilities, the applicant shall state such technical specifications, including
information of the amount, kind, and source of special nuclear material required, the
place of the use, the specific characteristics of the facility, and such other information
as the Commission may, by rule or regulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to
find that the utilization, or production of special nuclear material will be in accord
with the common defense and security and will provide ade-quate protection to the
health and safety of the public. Such technical speci-fications shall be a part of an
license issued. The Commission may at any time after the filing of the original
application, and before the expiration of the license, require further written statements
in order to enable the Com-mission to determine whether the application should be
granted or denied or whether a license should be modified or revoked. All
applications and statements shall be signed by the applicant or licensee under oath or
affirmation.
b. The Commission shall not issue any license for a utilization or pro-duction facility
for the generation of commercial power under section 103, until it has given notice in
writing to such regulatory agency as may have jurisdiction over the rates and services
of the proposed activity, to muni-cipalities, private utilities, public bodies, and
cooperatives within trans-mission distance authorized to engage in the distribution of
electric energy and until it has published notice of such application once each week
for four consecutive weeks in the Federal Register, and until four weeks after the last
notice.
c. The Commission, in issuing any license for utilization or production facility for the
generation of commercial power under section 103, shall give preferred consideration
to applications for such facilities which will be lo-cated in high cost power areas in
the United States if there are conflicting applications resulting from limited
opportunity for such license. Where such conflicting applications resulting from
limited opportunity for such license include those submitted by public or cooperative
bodies such applications shall be given preferred consideration.
Sec. 183: Terms of Licenses
Each license shall be in such form and contain such terms and conditions as the
Commission may, by rule or regulation, prescribe to effectuate the provisions of this
Act, including the following provisions:
a. Title to all special nuclear material utilized or produced by facilities pursuant to the
license, shall at all times be in the United States.
b. No right to the special nuclear material shall be conferred by the license except as
defined by the license.
c. Neither the license nor any right under the license shall be assigned or otherwise
transferred in violation of the provisions of this Act.
d. Every license issued under this Act shall be subject to the right of recapture or
control reserved by section 108, and to all of the other pro-visions of this Act, now or
hereafter in effect and to all valid rules and regu-lations of the Commission.
Sec. 184: Inalienability of Licenses
No license granted hereunder and no right to utilize or produce special nuclear
material granted hereby shall be transferred, assigned or in any manner disposed of,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, through transfer of control of
any license to any person, unless the Commission shall, after securing full
information, find that the transfer is in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and
shall give its consent in writing. The Commission may give such consent to the
creation of a mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon any facility owned or thereafter
acquired by a licensee, or upon any leasehold or other interest in such property, and
the rights of the creditors so secured may thereafter be enforced by any court subject
to rules and regulations estab-lished by the Commission to protect public health and
safety and promote the common defense and security.
Sec. 185: Construction Permits
All applicants for licenses to con-struct or modify production or utilization facilities
shall, if the application is otherwise acceptable to the Commission, be initially granted
a construction permit. The construction permit shall state the earliest and latest dates
for the completion of the construction or modification. Unless the construction or
modification of the facility is completed by the completion date, the con-struction
permit shall expire, and all rights thereunder be forfeited, unless upon good cause
shown, the Commission extends the completion date. Upon the completion of the
construction or modification of the facility, upon the filing of any additional
information needed to bring the original appli-cation up to date, and upon finding that
the facility authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the
application as amended and in conformity with the provisions of this Act and of the
rules and regu-lations of the Commission, and in the absence of any good cause being
shown to the Commission why the granting of a license would not be in accordance
with the provisions of this Act, the Commission shall thereupon issue a li-cense to the
applicant. For all other purposes of this Act, a construction permit is deemed to be a
'license.'
Sec. 186: Revocation
a. Any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application or
any statement of fact required under section 182, or because of conditions revealed by
such application or statement of fact or any report, record, or inspection or other
means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an
original application, or for failure to con-struct or operate a facility in accordance with
the terms of the construction permit or license or the technical specifications in the
application, or for violation of, or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of
this Act or of any regulation of the Commission.
b. The Commission shall follow the provisions of section 9(b) of the Administrative
Procedure Act in revoking any license.
c. Upon revocation of the license, the Commission may immediately retake
possession of all special nuclear material held by the licensee. In cases found by the
Commission to be of extreme importance to the national de-fense and security or to
the health and safety of the public, the Commission may recapture any special nuclear
material held by the licensee or may enter upon and operate the facility prior to any of
the procedures provided under the Administrative Procedure Act. Just compensation
shall be paid for the use of the facility,
Sec. 187: Modification of License
The terms and conditions of all li-censes shall be subject to amendment, revision, or
modification, by reason of amendments of this Act or by reason of rules and
regulations issued in accordance with the terms of this Act.
Sec. 188: Continued Operation of Facilities
Whenever the Com-mission finds that the public convenience and necessity or the
production program of the Commission requires continued operation of a production
fa-cility or utilization facility the license for which has been revoked pursuant to
section 186, the Commission may, after consultation with the appropriate regulatory
agency, State or Federal, having jurisdiction, order that pos-session be taken of and
such facility be operated for such period of time as the public convenience and
necessity or the production program of the Com-mission may, in the judgment of the
Commission, require, or until a license for the operation of the facility shall become
effective. just compensation shall be paid for the use of the facility.
Sec. 189: Hearings and judicial Review
a. In any proceeding under this Act, for the granting, suspending, re-voking, or
amending of any license or construction permit, or application to transfer control, and
in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing
with the activities of licensees, and in any pro-ceeding for the payment of
compensation, an award or royalties under sec-tions 153, 157, 186 c., or 188, the
Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may
be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such
proceeding.
b. Any final order entered in any proceeding of the kind specified in subsection a.
above shall be subject to judicial review in the manner pre-scribed in the Act of
December 29, 1950, as amended (ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129), and to the provisions of
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act as amended.
[/CENTER]
الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[[CENTER]COLOR=Blue]Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency[/COLOR]
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,
AWARE that nuclear activities are being carried out in a number of States,
NOTING that comprehensive measures have been and are being taken to ensure a
high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and
minimizing the consequences of any such accident, should it occur,
DESIRING to strengthen further international co-operation in the safe development
and use of nuclear energy,
CONVINCED of the need for an international framework which will facilitate the
prompt provision of assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological
emergency to mitigate its consequences,
NOTING the usefulness of bilateral and multilateral arrangements on mutual
assistance in this area,
NOTING the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in developing
guidelines for mutual emergency assistance arrangements in connection with a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
Article 1
General provisions
1. The States Parties shall cooperate between themselves and with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency")
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention to facilitate prompt
assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to
minimize its consequences and to protect life, property and the environment
from the effects of radioactive releases.
2. To facilitate such cooperation States Parties may agree on bilateral or
multilateral arrangements or, where appropriate, a combination of these, for
preventing or minimizing injury and damage which may result in the event of
a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
3. The States Parties request the Agency, acting within the framework of its
Statute, to use its best endeavours in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention to promote, facilitate and support the cooperation between States
Parties provided for in this Convention.
Article 2
Provision of assistance
1. If a State Party needs assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or
radiological emergency, whether or not such accident or emergency originates
within its territory, jurisdiction or control, it may call for such assistance from
any other State Party, directly or through the Agency, and from the Agency,
or, where appropriate, from other international intergovernmental
organizations (hereinafter referred to as "international organizations").
2. A State Party requesting assistance shall specify the scope and type of
assistance required and, where practicable, provide the assisting party with
such information as may be necessary for that party to determine the extent to
which it is able to meet the request. In the event that it is not practicable for
the requesting State Party to specify the scope and type of assistance required,
the requesting State Party and the assisting party shall, in consultation, decide
upon the scope and type of assistance required.
3. Each State Party to which a request for such assistance is directed shall
promptly decide and notify the requesting Slate Party, directly or through the
Agency, whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested, and the
scope and terms of the assistance that might be rendered.
4. States Parties shall, within the limits of their capabilities, identify and notify
the Agency of experts, equipment and materials which could be made
available for the provision of assistance to other States Parties in the event of a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency as well as the terms, especially
financial, under which such assistance could be provided.
5. Any State Party may request assistance relating to medical treatment or
temporary relocation into the territory of another State Party of people
involved in a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
6. The Agency shall respond, in accordance with its Statute and as provided for
in this Convention, to a requesting State Party's or a Member State's request
for assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency by:
a. making available appropriate resources allocated for this purpose;
b. transmitting promptly the request to other States and international
organizations which, according to the Agency's information, may possess the
necessary resources; and
c. if so requested by the requesting State, co-ordinating the assistance at the
international level which may thus become available.
Article 3
Direction and control of assistance
Unless otherwise agreed:
a. the overall direction, control, co-ordination and supervision of the assistance
shall be the responsibility within its territory of the requesting State. The assisting
party should, where the assistance involves personnel, designate in consultation with
the requesting State, the person who should be in charge of and retain immediate
operational supervision over the personnel and the equipment provided by it. The
designated person should exercise such supervision in cooperation with the
appropriate authorities of the requesting State;
b. the requesting State shall provide, to the extent of its capabilities, local
facilities and services for the proper and effective administration of the assistance. It
shall also ensure the protection of personnel, equipment and materials brought into its
territory by or on behalf of the assisting party for such purpose;
c. ownership of equipment and materials provided by either party during the
periods of assistance shall be unaffected, and their return shall be ensured;
d. a State Party providing assistance in response to a request under paragraph 5
of article 2 shall co-ordinate that assistance within its territory.
Article 4
Competent authorities and points of contact
1. Each State Party shall make known to the Agency and to other States Parties,
directly or through the Agency, its competent authorities and point of contact
authorized to make and receive requests for and to accept offers of assistance.
Such points of contact and a focal point within the Agency shall be available
continuously.
2. Each State Party shall promptly inform the Agency of any changes that may
occur in the information referred to in paragraph 1.
3. The Agency shall regularly and expeditiously provide to States Parties,
Member States and relevant international organizations the information
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Article 5
Functions of the Agency
The States Parties request the Agency, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 1 and
without prejudice to other provisions of this Convention, to:
a. collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information
concerning:
i. experts, equipment and materials which could be made available in the event
of nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies;
ii. methodologies, techniques and available results of research relating to
response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies;
b. assist a State Party or a Member State when requested in any of the following
or other appropriate matters:
. preparing both emergency plans in the case of nuclear accidents and
radiological emergencies and the appropriate legislation;
i. developing appropriate training programmes for personnel to deal with nuclear
accidents and radiological emergencies;
ii. transmitting requests for assistance and relevant information in the event of a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency;
iii. developing appropriate radiation monitoring programmes, procedures and
standards;
iv. conducting investigations into the feasibility of establishing appropriate
radiation monitoring systems;
c. make available to a State Party or a Member State requesting assistance in the
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency appropriate resources allocated
for the purpose of conducting an initial assessment of the accident or emergency;
d. offer its good offices to the States Parties and Member States in the event of a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency;
e. establish and maintain liaison with relevant international organizations for the
purposes of obtaining and exchanging relevant information and data, and make a list
of such organizations available to States Parties, Member States and the
aforementioned organizations.
Article 6
Confidentiality and public statements
1. The requesting State and the assisting party shall protect the confidentiality of
any confidential information that becomes available to either of them in
connection with the assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or
radiological emergency. Such information shall be used exclusively for the
purpose of the assistance agreed upon.
2. The assisting party shall make every effort to coordinate with the requesting
State before releasing information to the public on the assistance provided in
connection with a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
Article 7
Reimbursement of costs
1. An assisting party may offer assistance without costs to the requesting Slate.
When considering whether to offer assistance on such a basis, the assisting
party shall take into account:
a. the nature of the nuclear accident or radiological emergency;
b. the place of origin of the nuclear accident or radiological emergency;
c. the needs of developing countries;
d. the particular needs of countries without nuclear facilities; and
e. any other relevant factors.
2. When assistance is provided wholly or partly on a reimbursement basis, the
requesting State shall reimburse the assisting party for the costs incurred for
the services rendered by persons or organizations acting on its behalf, and for
all expenses in connection with the assistance to the extent that such expenses
are not directly defrayed by the requesting State. Unless otherwise agreed,
reimbursement shall be provided promptly after the assisting party has
presented its request for reimbursement to the requesting State, and in respect
of costs other than local costs, shall be freely transferrable.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, the assisting party may at any time waive, or
agree to the postponement of, the reimbursement in whole or in part. In
considering such waiver or postponement, assisting parties shall give due
consideration to the needs of developing countries.
Article 8
Privileges, immunities and facilities
1. The requesting State shall afford to personnel of the assisting party and
personnel acting on its behalf the necessary privileges, immunities and
facilities for the performance of their assistance functions.
2. The requesting State shall afford the following privileges and immunities to
personnel of the assisting party or personnel acting on its behalf who have
been duly notified to and accepted by the requesting State:
a. immunity from arrest, detention and legal process, including criminal, civil
and administrative jurisdiction, of the requesting State, in respect of acts or omissions
in the performance of their duties; and
b. exemption from taxation, duties or other charges, except those which are
normally incorporated in the price of goods or paid for services rendered, in respect of
the performance of their assistance functions.
3. The requesting State shall:
. afford the assisting party exemption from taxation, duties or other charges on
the equipment and property brought into the territory of the requesting State by the
assisting party for the purpose of the assistance; and
a. provide immunity from seizure, attachment or requisition of such equipment
and property.
4. The requesting State shall ensure the return of such equipment and property. If
requested by the assisting party, the requesting State shall arrange, to the
extent it is able to do so, for the necessary decontamination of recoverable
equipment involved in the assistance before its return.
5. The requesting State shall facilitate the entry into, stay in and departure from
its national territory of personnel notified pursuant to paragraph 2 and of
equipment and property involved in the assistance.
6. Nothing in this article shall require the requesting State to provide its nationals
or permanent residents with the privileges and immunities provided for in the
foregoing paragraphs.
7. Without prejudice to the privileges and immunities, all beneficiaries enjoying
such privileges and immunities under this article have a duty to respect the
laws and regulations of the requesting State. They shall also have the duty not
to interfere in the domestic affairs of the requesting State.
8. Nothing in this article shall prejudice rights and obligations with respect to
privileges and immunities afforded pursuant to other international agreements
or the rules of customary international law.
9. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention,
a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound in whole or in part by
paragraphs 2 and 3.
10. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 9
may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.
Article 9
Transit of personnel, equipment and property
Each State Party shall, at the request of the requesting State or the assisting party,
seek to facilitate the transit through its territory of duly notified personnel, equipment
and property involved in the assistance to and from the requesting State.
Article 10
Claims and compensation
1. The States Parties shall closely cooperate in order to facilitate the settlement of
legal proceedings and claims under this article.
2. Unless otherwise agreed, a requesting State shall in respect of death or of
injury to persons, damage to or loss of property, or damage to the environment
caused within its territory or other area under its jurisdiction or control in the
course of providing the assistance requested:
a. not bring any legal proceedings against the assisting party or persons or other
legal entities acting on its behalf;
b. assume responsibility for dealing with legal proceedings and claims brought
by third parties against the assisting party or against persons or other legal entities
acting on its behalf;
c. hold the assisting party or persons or other legal entities acting on its behalf
harmless in respect of legal proceedings and claims referred to in sub-paragraph (b);
and
d. compensate the assisting party or persons or other legal entities acting on its
behalf for:
i. death of or injury to personnel of the assisting party or persons acting on its
behalf;
ii. loss of or damage to non-consumable equipment or materials related to the
assistance;
except in cases of wilful misconduct by the individuals who caused the
death, injury, loss or damage.
3. This article shall not prevent compensation or indemnity available under any
applicable international agreement or national law of any State.
4. Nothing in this article shall require the requesting State to apply paragraph 2
in whole or in part to its nationals or permanent residents.
5. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention,
a State may declare:
. that it does not consider itself bound in whole or in part by paragraph 2;
a. that it will not apply paragraph 2 in whole or in part in cases of gross
negligence by the individuals who caused the death, injury, loss or damage.
6. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 5
may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.
Article 11
Termination of assistance
The requesting State or the assisting party may at any time, after appropriate
consultations and by notification in writing, request the termination of assistance
received or provided under this Convention. Once such a request has been made, the
parties involved shall consult with each other to make arrangements for the proper
conclusion of the assistance.
Article 12
Relationship to other international agreements
This Convention shall not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of States Parties
under existing international agreements which relate to the matters covered by this
Convention, or under future international agreements concluded in accordance with
the object and purpose of this Convention.
Article 13
Settlement of disputes
1. In the event of a dispute between States Parties, or between a State Party and
the Agency, concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention,
the parties to the dispute shall consult with a view to the settlement of the
dispute by negotiation or by any other peaceful means of settling disputes
acceptable to them.
2. If a dispute of this character between States Parties cannot be settled within
one year from the request for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall, at
the request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred
to the International Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted
to arbitration, if, within six months from the date of the request, the parties to
the dispute are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, a party
may request the President of The International Court of Justice or the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint one or more arbitrators. In
cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority.
3. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention,
a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of
the dispute settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. The other States
Parties shall not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in
paragraph 2 with respect to a State Party for which such a declaration is in
force.
4. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3
may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.
Article 14
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States and Namibia,
represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, at the Headquarters of
the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of
the United Nations in New York, from 26 September 1986 and 6 October
1986 respectively, until its entry into force or for twelve months, whichever
period is longer.
2. A State and Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia,
may express its consent to be bound by this Convention either by signature, or
by deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval following
signature made subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, or by deposit of
an instrument of accession. The instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession shall be deposited with the depositary.
3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound
has been expressed by three States.
4. For each State expressing consent to be bound by this Convention after its
entry into force, this Convention shall enter into force for that State thirty days
after the date of expression of consent.
5.
a. This Convention shall be open for accession, as provided for in this
article, by international organizations and regional integration
organizations constituted by sovereign States, which have competence
in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of
international agreements in matters covered by this Convention.
b. In matters within their competence such organizations shall, on their own
behalf, exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations which this Convention attributes
to States Parties.
c. When depositing its instrument of accession, such an organization shall
communicate to the depositary a declaration indicating the extent of its competence in
respect of matters covered by this Convention.
d. Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its Member
States.
Article 15
Provisional application
A State may, upon signature or at any later date before this Convention enters into
force for it, declare that it will apply this Convention provisionally.
Article 16
Amendments
1. A State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it
immediately to all other States Parties.
2. If a majority of the States Parties request the depositary to convene a
conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite
all States Parties to attend such a conference to begin not sooner than thirty
days after the invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the
conference by a two-thirds majority of all States Parties shall be laid down in a
protocol which is open to signature in Vienna and New York by all States
Parties.
3. The protocol shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has
been expressed by three States. For each State expressing consent to be bound
by the protocol after its entry into force, the protocol shall enter into force for
that State thirty days after the date of expression of consent.
Article 17
Denunciation
1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the
depositary.
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which the
notification is received by the depositary.
Article 18
Depositary
1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the depositary of this
Convention.
2. The Director General of the Agency shall promptly notify States Parties and
all other States of:
a. each signature of this Convention or any protocol of amendment;
b. each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
concerning this Convention or any protocol of amendment;
c. any declaration or withdrawal thereof in accordance with articles 8, 10 and 13;
d. any declaration of provisional application of this Convention in accordance
with article 15;
e. the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendment thereto; and
f. any denunciation made under article 17.
Article 19
Authentic texts and certified copies
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies to
States Parties and all other States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this
Convention, open for signature as provided for in paragraph 1 of article 14.
ADOPTED by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency
meeting in special session at Vienna on the twenty-sixth day of September one
thousand nine hundred and eighty-six.
*/ The date of entry into force will be announced in an Addendum to this document.
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الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[[CENTER]COLOR=Blue]CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (CPPNM[/COLOR])
Opened for Signature: 3 March 1980.
Entered into Force: 8 February 1987. The Convention does not set any limits on its dura-tion.
Number of Signatories: 45 States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
Number of Parties: 115 States and EURATOM.
Depositary: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General (INFCIRC/274/Rev.1).
Scope of Application: Pursuant to Article 2, the Convention applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport. The Convention does not apply to nuclear materials used for military purposes or to those used for peaceful purposes but not in international trans-port. The latter are covered by the information circu-lar INFCIRC/225/Rev4, a set of recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material.
The limited scope of the Convention corresponds to States’ positions, during its negotiation, that physical nuclear protection should fall in the domestic sphere. It therefore remains a national responsibility—not subject to binding international standards. However, increasing security concerns of large-scale terrorism, prompted by the September 11th attacks, have led to the initiation of an amendment process that would expand the Convention’s scope to cover, inter alia, the physical protection of nuclear material in domes-tic use, storage, and transport, and the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage. While points of political difference remain, States have developed a renewed interest in convening a Diplomatic Conference to amend and strengthen the Convention, which will be convened in July 2005.
Provisions: The CPPNM obligates parties to:
-make specific arrangements and meet defined stan-dards of physical protection for international ship-ments of nuclear material for peaceful purposes (plu-tonium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and irradiated fuel), according to Annexes I and II and IAEA INFCIRC/225;
-undertake not to export or import nuclear materials or to allow their transit through their territory unless they have received assurances that these materials will be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention;
-co-operate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material, by sharing information on missing nuclear materials;
-criminalize specified acts, including misusing or threatening to misuse nuclear materials to harm the public; and
-prosecute or extradite those accused of committing such acts. States Parties undertake to include those offenses as extraditable offenses in every future ex-tradition treaty to be concluded between them.
The Convention also promotes international coopera-tion in the exchange of physical protection informa-tion.
Verification and Compliance: Verification: States Parties must identify and make known to each other directly or through the IAEA their central authority and point of contact having responsibility for physi-cal protection of nuclear material and for coordinat-ing recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use, or alteration of nu-clear material or in the event of a credible threat thereof. The Convention does not provide for inspec-tions. Compliance: Article 17 provides for dispute settlement procedures, but allows parties to opt out of those procedures.
Reservations: Several States Parties, including Ar-gentina, Belarus, China, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Gua-temala, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Af-rica, Spain, and Turkey, declared that they were not bound by the provision of Article 17, paragraph 2, which provides for the submission of disputes to arbi-tration or their referral to the International Court of Justice in the case of an inability to resolve the dis-pute on the basis of negotiations between the States Parties.
Review Conferences: Pursuant to Article 16 of the Convention, a Review Conference five years after its entry into force was held in Vienna from 29 Septem-ber to 1 October 1992 and attended by 35 States Par-ties. The Review Conference unanimously expressed its full support for the Convention. Subsequently, repeated calls have been made by the IAEA and its Member States for the strengthening of the CPPNM as an important contributor to nuclear security.
2005: The Conference to Consider and Adopt Pro-posed Amendments to the Convention on the Physi-cal Protection of Nuclear Materials was held 4-8 July in Vienna to discuss strengthening existing provi-sions and expand the scope of the convention.
Delegates from 89 countries agreed on “fundamental changes” to strengthen the treaty to better address issues of nuclear terrorism, smuggling, and sabotage. The amended CPPNM legally binds states to the pro-tection of nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport. It also provides for enhanced cooperation between states regarding the rapid location and recovery of stolen or smuggled nuclear materials, mitigation of radiological conse-quences of sabotage, and prevention of combat-related offenses.
The new rules dictated by the amendments will come into effect once two-thirds of the 112 States Parties to the convention ratify the changes. The IAEA states that it would actively assist Member States in their efforts to ratify and implement the obligations of the CPPNM.
2004: During the first half of the year, further con-sultations were held among a number of States Par-ties to the CPPNM on the outstanding issues of the Final Report of the “Open-Ended Group of Legal and Technical Experts to Prepare a Draft Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.”
On 5 July, the IAEA Director General circulated pro-posed amendments to the CPPNM suggested by the governments of Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States. Should a majority of States Parties to the CPPNM so request, the Director General will invite all States Parties to the CPPNM to a conference for consideration of the proposed amendments.
2003: From 3 to 14 March 2003, the group of legal and technical experts held its last meeting to prepare its recommendation on a well-defined amendment to the Convention. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Den-nis Flory, the group adopted a Final Report that rec-ommended the extension of the scope of the CPPNM to cover, inter alia, the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, and the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage. However, the prepared text still contained a number of bracketed clauses on which the group was not able to reach agreement. On June, the IAEA Director General distributed the Final Re-port to the States Parties urging them to work rapidly towards consensus on the text in order to have a Dip-lomatic Conference to adopt the proposed amend-
ments at an early date.
2002: The Fourth Meeting for Legal and Technical Experts to prepare a draft for amendment of the Physical Protection Convention was held on 2-6 Sep-tember, in which around 120 delegations from 46 States participated. During the meeting, the partici-pants were anticipated concluding the draft, but failed to agree on the methodology to incorporate Funda-mental Principles of Physical protection in the draft and the scope of sabotage and question of sanction for its environmental damage related to the interna-tional commission. Later an international conference on physical protection was held on 8-13 September, which was titled “Strengthening Practices for Protect-ing Nuclear Material.” The goal of the Conference was to strengthen the international regime of physical protection against new threats as well as to prepare political and technical countermeasures against illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive materials. The working groups were separated into three topics, international standards, research and development and training programs.
2001: In February, the Fourth Working Group meet-ing of the Informal Open-Ended Expert Meeting to discuss whether there was a need to revise the Con-vention was held. It adopted a Final Report, in which the working group recommended the strengthening of the existing Convention by a well-defined amend-ment that would cover, among other topics, domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material with the exclusion of nuclear material and nuclear facilities for military use, mandatory international oversight, periodic national reporting, peer reviews, and manda-tory use of INFCIRC/225. It also recommended drafting a resolution for the IAEA General Confer-ence with the aim of strengthening the physical pro-tection regime.
The June 2001 Informal Open-Ended Expert Meeting adopted this Final Report. The meeting concluded that an amendment to strengthen the Convention should be drafted and then be reviewed by the States Parties with the view to determine if it should be submitted to an amendment conference. It also rec-ommended that the IAEA Director-General convene a group of legal and technical experts to draft such an amendment.
2000: On 22-24 February, the First Working Group meeting to discuss whether to revise the Convention took place in Vienna. The meeting participants de-cided to establish five working sub-groups on differ-ent related matters, including illicit trafficking and physical protection assistance. The Second Working Group meeting, convened on 26-30 June, discussed five working papers related to the competency of the five working sub-groups established at the first meet-ing.
In May, the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in its Final Document, noted the paramount importance of effective physical
protection of all nuclear material, the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection, and called on all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials. The Conference urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere to the Convention by the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (corrected) and in other relevant guidelines. The se-ries of the IAEA documents INFCIRC/225Rev.l, Rev.2, Rev.3, and Rev.4 represent the existing inter-national consensus guidelines and recommendations intended to apply to the physical protection of nu-clear material in use, storage, and transport, whether domestic or international and whether peaceful or military. The Conference also welcomed the ongoing informal discussions among legal and technical ex-perts, under the aegis of IAEA, to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention.
On 20-24 November, the Third Working Group meeting of the Informal Open-Ended Expert Meeting to discuss whether there was a need to revise the Convention was held in Vienna. The meeting was convened to discuss and review several papers pre-sented by the IAEA and Member States. The Work-ing Group recommended that a draft resolution on wider adherence to the Convention should be pre-sented to the IAEA General Conference in 2001. It also recommended that the IAEA create a Standing Advisory Group on security.
1998-1999: In response to the request of some States Parties to the Convention to hold a meeting to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention, the Director-General of the IAEA decided to convene an Informal Open-Ended Expert Meeting at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna from 15-19 November 1999. The meeting considered proposals by the United Kingdom, France Germany, Belgium, and Sweden to look more broadly at the question. The meeting con-cluded that the next meeting should be held in May 2001, and before that, a working group should be established to make recommendations to the Expert Meeting.
1997: In September, members of the IAEA Board of Governors voiced support to move towards a possible review of the Convention. They suggested that the Agency should consider the possibility of convening a meeting of interested States to address the issues involved in such a review. It was agreed that in case of sufficient support for such a meeting, it would be convened in 1998.
1996: The participants at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in April recognized the impor-tance of effective nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection and fundamental re-sponsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear material in their possession and the necessity
for effective national systems for nuclear accounting, control, and physical protection. They urged all States that had not yet done so to ratify the Conven-tion at the earliest possible date.
1992-1993: The first Review Conference, attended by 35 States Parties, was held from 29 September-1 October 1992 in Vienna. The Review Conference unanimously expressed its full support for the Con-vention and urged all States to take action to become party to the Convention. The conference reaffirmed that the Convention provides a sound basis for the physical protection of the transport of nuclear mate-rial, the recovery and return of any stolen material, and the application of sanctions against any person who may commit criminal acts involving nuclear material. It concluded that no changes were needed in the Convention. The Conference also called upon the IAEA to organize a meeting to examine the IAEA physical protection recommendations in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.2, and to consider the incorporation of further guidance on such issues as irradiated fuel, nuclear material contained in waste, and other matters. As a result of a Technical Commit-tee meeting in June 1993, revised recommendations were issued in September 1993 (as INFCIRC/225/ Rev.3) that reflect the Committee's views in these respects.
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الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[[CENTER]COLOR=Blue]Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy[/COLOR]
Adopted in Paris, 29. 7.1960
Amended, 28. 1.1964
Entered into force, April 1, 1968
Objectives
To ensure adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage
caused by nuclear incidents, whilst ensuring that the development of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes is not thereby hindered. To unify the basic rules in various
countries relating to liability incurred for such damage.
Provisions
(a) The operator of a nuclear installation to be liable for damage to or loss of life of
any person and damage to or loss of any property upon proof that such loss or damage
was caused by a nuclear incident involving either nuclear fuel or radioactive products
or waste in, or nuclear substances coming from, such an installation (art. 3);
(b) Maximum liability of operator defined (art. 7);
© Actions must be brought within 10 years from the date of the nuclear incident (art.
8);
(d) Operator not liable if incident caused by act of armed conflict, invasion, civil war
or grave natural disaster of an exceptional character (art. 9);
(e) Operator must maintain insurance to cover his liability (art. 10).
Membership
Open for accession by any State, subject to the unanimous consent of the parties, by
notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Parties and dates of entry into force
Belgium l. 4.1968
Denmark 4. 9.1974
Finland 16. 6.1972
France 1. 4.1968
Germany, Federal Republic of 30. 9.1975
Greece 12. 5.1970
Italy 17. 9.1975
Netherlands 28.12.1979
Norway 2. 7.1973
Portugal 29. 9.1977
Spain 1. 4.1968
Sweden 1. 4.1968
Turkey 5. 4.1968
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* 1. 4.1968
* Extended to British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong,
Montserrat, Falkland Islands, St. Helena, Isle of Man and Bailiwick of Guernsey.
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الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[[CENTER]COLOR=Blue]JOINT DECLARATION OF SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA[/COLOR]
Signed: 20 January 1992.
Entered into Force: 19 February 1992.
Under the Joint Declaration, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) agree not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
Verification and Compliance: According to the Joint Declaration, the two sides will conduct inspections of locations chosen by the other side and mutually agreed upon by both sides. The two Koreas also established the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) as an implementing mechanism of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration (JDD) in March 1992. The JNCC has not been able to reach agreement on the reciprocal inspection regime and has been stalled since 1993.
Developments: (for related information, see sections on the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, KEDO, and IAEA)
2002: On 16 October North Korea admitted that it had been conducting a secret uranium enrichment program, which Pyongyang agreed to halt under the 1994 DPRK-US Agreement Framework. On 28 October a joint statement issued by the United States together with Japan and the ROK concluded that the DPRK’s program was a violation of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
2001: Despite the fact that the Joint Declaration had been in force since February 1992, no inspections were conducted within the framework of the Joint Declaration. The last JNCC meeting was convened in January 1993.
2000: In February, President Clinton certified to the US Congress that the implementation of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was progressing.
1995: On 19 September, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution exhorting President Bill Clinton not to improve relations or
ease economic restrictions on North Korea until it made efforts to fulfill the terms of the North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
1994: On 31 January, South Korea said that it would proceed with the 1994 Team Spirit military exercise unless North Korea allowed international inspections of its nuclear-related facilities.
On 15 August, as a response to the DPRK’s announcement that it was ready to terminate construction of its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in exchange for the light water nuclear reactor and economic incentives, South Korea offered North Korea “the necessary capital and technology” to build light water reactors “if and when the North guaranteed the transparency of its nuclear facilities.”
On 21 October, the United States and DPRK signed an Agreed Framework. Under one of its provisions, both countries pledged to strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK committed to taking steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and engaging in North-South dialogue. The Agreed Framework, however, did not link the sequencing of actions in the Agreed Framework with any timeframe for carrying out the provisions of the North-South Joint Declaration. The United States announced cancellation of the Team Spirit military exercises in 1994.
1993: On 25 January, during the 13th JNCC meeting, North Korea refused to discuss any type of negotiations until the US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises were cancelled. South Korea announced that the exercises would commence this year because the mutual nuclear inspections issue had not been resolved. North Korea announced that it would take “necessary self-defensive measures” if the Team Spirit military exercises were conducted. The exercises were to be held from January-April 1993.
On 12 March, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since then, the developments around the Joint Declaration were overshadowed by the attempts of the international
community to bring North Korea back into the NPT and ensure its compliance with the Treaty.
On 27 March, South Korea announced that it would consider ending Team Spirit military exercises permanently if North Korea reversed its decision to withdraw from the NPT.
On 9 June, the DPRK suspended its withdrawal from the NPT.
On 1 September, North Korea called for urgent talks with South Korea concerning the long-standing dispute over inspections of nuclear facilities. South Korea agreed to North Korea’s proposal to resume dialogue on nuclear issues through the exchange of envoys.
1992: In February, the DPRK and ROK agreed to form the JNCC by 19 March in order for it to oversee the mutual nuclear inspections.
On 20 February, the DPRK and ROK exchanged agreements on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula. The ROK indicated that it was necessary for North Korea to produce more evidence to verify that its nuclear intentions were peaceful. During the meeting, North Korean President Kim II-Sung ignored the South Korean demand for mutual nuclear inspections to take place at an early date. Kim also dismissed Western reports that North Korea was close to constructing a nuclear bomb. Kim said that North Korea did not intend to enter into a nuclear arms race with its neighbors. It was agreed that the matter would be discussed in greater detail during talks scheduled for the spring of 1992 between North Korean President Kim Il-Sung and South Korean President Roh Tae-Woo.
On 28 February, North Korea rejected South Korea’s deadline request for mutual trial inspections by 18 March. North Korea also refused to finalize the procedures for mutual inspections by 18 April. South Korea’s Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Man-Soon said that North Korea would be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium by June 1992. On 5 March, South Korea announced that the United States would like to participate in inter-Korean inspections of the suspected nuclear facilities.
On 14 March, North Korea and South Korea concluded an agreement to establish the JNCC and conduct inspections of nuclear facilities in early-June 1992. The inspections agreement, however, did not hold North Korea to a strict schedule and did not mention specific nuclear facilities in North Korea. According to Article 4, the Koreas would jointly try to adopt the necessary documents for verifying the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula within an
approximately two-month timeframe after 19 March. The sides agreed that inspections would begin within 20 days. North Korea also demanded to inspect US military bases in the ROK in order to verify withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea.
On 19 March, the Parties held the first meeting of the JNCC in order to develop a specific plan for proposed mutual inspections of suspected nuclear weapons sites. However, little progress was made with North Korea saying that the agreements signed with the South were merely statements of intent and were therefore not binding. Despite the announcement, South Korea advocated regular bilateral inspections of nuclear sites four times a year with 12 special inspections annually.
During the second JNCC meeting on 1 April, the DPRK and ROK failed to reach an agreement on inspection proposals. South Korea proposed that regular inspections be conducted on nuclear materials and facilities at least 16 times a year, and that special inspections be conducted on military bases at least 40 times a year. South Korea also requested that equal numbers of facilities be inspected by both Parties. North Korea responded by saying that South Korea should allow inspections of all US bases, but that the only site it would allow to be inspected was the Yongbyon nuclear facility.
On 19 April, during the third JNCC meeting, North and South Korea attempted to discuss regulations for mutual inspections. However, no progress was made. South Korea insisted that the number of sites inspected for both sides be equal and subject to mutual inspections based on the principle of reciprocity. North Korea, however, said that if Yongbyon were to be opened for inspection, all US military installations in South Korea must be opened for inspection.
On 15 May, during the JNCC fourth meeting, South Korea suggested that special inspections of nuclear facilities be conducted 24 hours after notification. South Korea also demanded that North Korea stopped constructing its reprocessing facility.
On 27 May, during the fifth JNCC meeting, very little progress was made on the issue of mutual inspections. By delaying discussion on inspection guidelines, North Korea blocked any possibility of mutual inspections prior to July 1992. South Korea responded by warning North Korea that delaying talks further could lead to an impasse in inter-Korean exchanges in other areas.
On 12 June, South Korea announced that North Korea was breaking the nuclear-weapon-free zone
agreement by building a reprocessing facility. North Korea, however, claimed that the facility was a “radiochemical laboratory.” South Korea said that it would not take further reconciliatory measures with North Korea unless it opened its facilities to South Korean inspectors. The DPRK stated that the major obstacle to the North-South talks was South Korea’s refusal to allow North Korean inspections of US military bases in the South. The North wanted to determine whether these bases might house nuclear weapons. North Korea demanded that it be allowed to inspect all US military installations before it stopped reprocessing. However, neither South Korea nor the United States agreed to such terms. North Korea then indicated that it would stop reprocessing in exchange for light water reactor technology from the West.
On 26 June, during the sixth JNCC meeting, negotiations came to a standstill when South Korea insisted that its suspicion of North Korea’s nuclear program was greater than ever despite the fact that North Korea had said that all suspicion had been removed through IAEA inspections. South Korea said that North Korea might inspect US military bases in the South if the North reciprocated by opening its military bases to inspection. South Korea requested that mutual inspections begin before September 1992.
On 21 July, during the seventh JNCC meeting, no progress was made again. North Korea rejected the South’s proposal for 24-hour notice challenge inspections of military sites. South Korea reminded North Korea that no economic exchange could take place in the absence of a nuclear accord. South Korea also announced that IAEA inspections were not enough to deter North Korea from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The eighth meeting in August also ended in failure. The two sides, however, agreed to prepare proposed inspection regulations for the next meeting.
On 16 September, during the ninth JNCC meeting, North Korea demanded that the United States and South Korea terminate their Team Spirit military exercises. South Korea had decided to resume the exercises due to a lack of progress in the JNCC meetings to establish mutual inspections. North Korea accused the United States of shipping nuclear weapons via submarines to the South Korean port of Chinhae. The two countries failed to reach an agreement on “challenge inspections” of military sites.
On 19 September, during the 10th JNCC meeting, North Korea continued to stress the urgency of its being allowed to inspect US bases in South Korea for nuclear weapons, while South Korea denied that any
nuclear weapons or bases exist on its territory. North and South Korea agreed to speed up the process of drafting and discussing inspection regulations proposals.
On 8 October, the United States announced that due to North Korea’s refusal to accept mutual nuclear inspections with South Korea, the United States and South Korea would most likely postpone removing US troops from South Korea. In response to that, later in October, the DPRK withdrew from the JNCC talks. The DPRK stated that it will stop all channels of inter-Korean dialogue if South Korea did not cancel Team Spirit military exercises with the United States. South Korea responded by stating that it would cancel the exercises if North Korea were willing to adopt guidelines for mutual inspections by the end of November 1992, and allow the first inspections to commence by 20 December.
On 27 November, during the 11th JNCC meeting, the inter-Korean dialogue collapsed. North Korea repeated its demand for the cancellation of Team Spirit military exercises. South Korea responded by demanding that North Korea allow a minimum of one inspection before it halted the exercises. South Korea said that the exercises would resume unless substantial progress was made with at least one mutual inspection before the next prime ministers’ meeting in Seoul on 21 December 1992. North Korea announced the suspension of further joint committee dialogue with South Korea, excluding JNCC meetings. The next, 12th JNCC meeting in December did not produce any positive results either.
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الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[[CENTER]COLOR=Blue]Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna
Convention and the Paris Convention[/COLOR]
1. The Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and
the Paris Convention was adopted by the Conference on the Relationship
between the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention, jointly convened
by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development at the Headquarters on the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, on 21 September 1988, and
opened for signature on that date. It entered into force on 27 April 1992
pursuant to Article VII, which provides for entry into force three months after
the date of deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession by at least five States Party to the Vienna Convention and five
States Party to the Paris Convention.
2. The text of the Joint Protocol, taken from a certified copy, is reproduced
herein for the information of all Members.
On 28 February 1997, an addendum was issued to this document
(INFCIRC/402/Add.3 ( 131 KB)).
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the
Paris Convention
The Contracting Parties
HAVING REGARD to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
of 21 May 1963;
HAVING REGARD to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 as amended by the additional Protocol of 28 January
1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982;
CONSIDERING that the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention are similar in
substance and that no State is at present a Party to both Conventions;
CONVINCED that adherence to either Convention by Parties to the other Convention
could lead to difficulties resulting from the simultaneous application of both
Conventions to a nuclear incident; and
DESIROUS to establish a link between the Vienna Convention and the Paris
Convention by mutually extending the benefit of the special regime of civil liability
for nuclear damage set forth under each Convention and to eliminate conflicts arising
from the simultaneous applications of both Conventions to a nuclear incident;
HAVE AGREED as follows:
Article I
In this Protocol:
a. "Vienna Convention" means the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 and any amendment thereto which is in force for a
Contracting Party to this Protocol;
b. Paris Convention means the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 and any amendment thereto which is in force
for a Contracting Party to this Protocol.
Article II
For the purpose of this Protocol:
a. The operator of a nuclear installation situated in the territory of a Party to the
Vienna Convention shall be liable in accordance with that Convention for nuclear
damage suffered in the territory of a Party to both the Paris Convention and this
Protocol;
b. The operator of a nuclear installation situated in the territory of a Party to the
Paris Convention shall be liable in accordance with that Convention for nuclear
damage suffered in the territory of a Party to both the Vienna Convention and this
Protocol.
Article III
1. Either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention shall apply to a nuclear
incident to the exclusion of the other.
2. In the case of a nuclear incident occurring in a nuclear installation, the
applicable Convention shall be that to which the State is a Party within whose
territory that installation is situated.
3. In the case of a nuclear incident outside a nuclear installation and involving
nuclear material in the course of carriage, the applicable Convention shall be
that to which the State is a Party within whose territory the nuclear installation
is situated whose operator is liable pursuant to either Article II.l(b) and © of
the Vienna Convention or Article 4(a) and (b) of the Paris Convention.
Article IV
1. Articles I to XV of the Vienna Convention shall be applied, with respect to the
Contracting Parties to this Protocol which are Parties to the Paris Convention,
in the same manner as between Parties to the Vienna Convention.
2. Articles 1 to 14 of the Paris Convention shall be applied, with respect to the
Contracting Parties to this Protocol which are Parties to the Vienna
Convention, in the same manner as between Parties to the Paris Convention.
Article V
This Protocol shall be open for signature, from 21 September 1988 until the date of its
entry into force, at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency by all
States which have signed, ratified or acceded to either the Vienna Convention or the
Paris Convention.
Article VI
1. This Protocol is subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall only be accepted from
States Party to either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention. Any
such State which has not signed this Protocol may accede to it.
2. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be
deposited with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, who is hereby designated as the depositary of this Protocol.
Article VII
1. This Protocol shall come into force three months after the date of deposit of
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by at least five
States Party to the Vienna Convention and five States Party to the Paris
Convention. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this
Protocol after the deposit of the above-mentioned instruments this Protocol
shall enter into force three months after the date of deposit of the instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
2. This Protocol shall remain in force as long as both the Vienna Convention and
the Paris Convention are in force.
Article VIII
1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Protocol by written notification to
the depositary.
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date on which the notification
is received by the depositary.
Article IX
1. Any Contracting Party which ceases to be a Party to either the Vienna
Convention or the Paris Convention shall notify the depositary of the
termination of the application of that Convention with respect to it and of the
date such termination takes effect.
2. This Protocol shall cease to apply to a Contracting Party which has terminated
application of either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention on the
date such termination takes effect.
Article X
The depositary shall promptly notify Contracting Parties and States invited to the
Conference on the relationship between the Paris Convention and the Vienna
Convention as well as the Secretary General of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development of:
a. Each signature of this Protocol;
b. Each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession concerning this Protocol;
c. The entry into force of this Protocol;
d. Any denunciation; and
e. Any information received pursuant to Article IX.
Article XI
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the depositary, who
shall send certified copies to Contracting Parties and States invited to the Conference
on the relationship between the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention as well
as the Secretary General of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized by their respective
Governments for that purpose have signed the present Joint Protocol.
DONE at Vienna this twenty-first day of September, one thousand nine hundred and
eighty-eight.
[/CENTER]
الطاقة النووية بين السلم والحرب - مجلة السياسة الدولية (من أرشيف المجلة) - نزار عثمان - 09-11-2006
[[CENTER]COLOR=Blue]New partnership approach to the implementation of safeguards in
the Community, by the IAEA and Euratom:[/COLOR]
text of joint declaration [April 1992]
Effective and Efficient Implementation of Safeguards by the IAEA and EURATOM
under the Agreement (INFCIRC/193)
1. The Director General of the IAEA Dr. Blix and Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha
have reviewed the implementation of safeguards according to INFCIRC/193.
2. They concluded that further efforts should be made to enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of safeguards implementation.
3. To this end they concluded that the time has come to strengthen safeguards
collaboration in a way that takes into account not only the effectiveness of safeguards
but also safeguards efficiency and, in so doing, gives full effect to the purposes of the
Agreement.
4. This will be founded on:
(i) The initiation of a new partnership approach to replace the existing approaches of
Observation
and Joint Teams.
(ii) The translation of this concept into practical arrangements under the guidance of
the high level Liaison Committee.
(iii) A re-evaluation of the role of the Liaison Committee and its relationship to its
subsidiary bodies.
5. Subject to the ability of both organizations to satisfy the requirements of their
criteria and guidelines respectively the new approach will be based on the following
elements:
(i) The optimisation of the necessary practical arrangements and the use of commonly
agreed:
· safeguards approaches
· inspection planning and procedures
· inspection activities
· inspection instruments, methods and techniques.
(ii) The inspection activities will be performed on the basis of the principle of onejob-
one-man supplemented by quality control measures to enable both organisations
to satisfy their respective obligations to reach their own independent conclusions and
required assurances. These arrangements will be designed and performed in such a
manner that they do not result in unnecessary duplication of effort.
(iii) Use of commonly shared analysis capabilities in order to reduce the number of
samples to be taken, transported and analyzed. Cooperation in research and
development and in the training of inspectors with the aim to achieve a reduction of
resources spent on both sides and to lead to commonly agreed products and
procedures.
(iv) Increasing common use of technologies to replace, to the extent possible, the
physical presence of inspectors by appropriate equipment.
6. The partnership approach will allow both the IAEA and Euratom to meet their
respective responsibilities under the Agreement (INFCIRC/193). The necessary
practical arrangements will be established by the Liaison Committee combining full
transparency in planning and coordination with partnership in the inspections and
with common evaluation.
7. The Director General of the IAEA Dr. Blix and Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha
expect that this approach will allow considerable rationalization of resources resulting
in a significant reduction in inspection efforts under the Agreement. They request the
Liaison Committee to report to them as soon as possible and not later than the end of
the year on progress made in the implementation of the new partnership approach.
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