Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed Statements and Common
Understandings Regarding the Treaty*



Signed at Vienna June 18, 1979
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,
Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to
continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,
Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for
in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help
to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and
security,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,
Guided by the principle of equality and equal security,
Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the
Parties and the interests of international security,
Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further
reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and
complete disarmament,
Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit
and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit
strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the
development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures
provided for in this Treaty.
Article II
For the purposes of this Treaty:
1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of
ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the
northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of
America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.
* The text of the SALT II Treaty and Protocol, as signed in Vienna, is accompanied
by a set of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, also signed by President
Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev, which is prefaced as follows:
In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties
have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings
undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
As an aid to the reader, the texts of the Agreed Statements and Common
Understandings are beneath the articles of the Treaty or Protocol to which they
pertain.
First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers," as
defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have
been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed
and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to
have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.
First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that
launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.
Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for
launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training
launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms
provided for in Article III of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the
Treaty.
Third Common Understanding. The one hundred and seventy-seven former Atlas
and Titan I ICBM launchers of the United States of America, which are no longer
operational and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the
limitations provided for in the Treaty.
Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in
force, mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for
in the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that
mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date.
2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic
missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic
missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type.
Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United
States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered
submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine,
regardless of its type.
3. Heavy bombers are considered to be:
(a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types,
and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and
Myasishchev types;
(b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber
in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above;
© types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers; and
(d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.
First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers," as used in paragraph 3 of Article II
and other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be
equipped for bombs or missiles.
Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case
basis in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as
heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty; in
this connection the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty.
Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case
determinations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a
heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as
referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the
Standing Consultative Commission.
Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in
paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties
further agree that:
(a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be
considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related
observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy
bomber;
(b) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be
bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that
they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a
range in excess of 600 kilometers, except that heavy bombers of current types, as
designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be
of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers
shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis
of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and
© airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall
not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have
functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform
the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current
types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise
would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers
of a type equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally
observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs.
First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are
differences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these
airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can
perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in
excess of 600 kilometers or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber
equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable
by national technical means. To this end, the Parties may take, as appropriate,
cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national
technical means.
Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev-142 airplanes in their current configuration, that is,
in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a
type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article
II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of
Article II of the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of
Tupolev-142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a
precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers
pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the
Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes.
Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry into force of
the Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its thirty-one
Myasishchev airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the
Treaty functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot
perform the mission of a heavy bomber.
Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America
and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in
subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner:
Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52
and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same
designations;
Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
the Tupolev-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the
Bear type; and
Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the
Bison type.
4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range
in excess of 600 kilometers and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings.
5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for
launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.
First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching
an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be
considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs
equipped with MIRVs.
First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an
SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been
developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.
Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for
launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type,
except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the
corresponding aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to
the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.
Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs
and SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more
independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also
been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which
are not independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such
ICBMs and SLBMs are: for the United States of America, Minuteman III ICBMs,
Poseidon C-3 SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs.
Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a
case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped
with MIRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first
flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs
when first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped
with MIRVs when first flight-tested.
Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America
and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with
MIRVs correspond in the following manner:
-- Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman
III and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a
light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles;
-- Missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Poseidon C-
3 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an
SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles;
-- Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4
and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an
SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles;
-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the
RS-16 and known to the United States of America as the SS-17, a light ICBM that has
been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles;
-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the
RS-18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms
of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with
a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;
-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the
RS-20 and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms
of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested
with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles;
-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the
RSM-50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that
has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles.
Third Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:
(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry
vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are
accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing
mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or
other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket
engines, or aerodynamic systems;
(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along
trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other
devices which may be developed in the future.
Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM
launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics are included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the
Treaty.
Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted,
constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural
design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are
launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of
missiles not equipped with MIRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of
missiles not equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles
equipped with MIRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the
launchers. Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs shall be
distinguishable from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MIRVs
on the basis of externally observable design features of the submarines.
This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or
construction programs, or to programs including significant changes to the principal
observable structural design features of launchers, underway as of the date of
signature of the Treaty.
6. ASBMs equipped with MIRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flighttested
with MIRVs.
First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with
MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more
independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also
been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which
are not independently targetable.
Second Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:
(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry
vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are
accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing
mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or
other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket
engines, or aerodynamic systems;
(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along
trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other
devices which may be developed in the future.
7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight
greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight,
respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of
this Treaty.
First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully
loaded missile itself at the time of launch.
Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight
of:
(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;
(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or
more reentry vehicles; and
© its penetration aids, including devices for their release.
Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the
definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to
paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and
targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more
reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their
reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters
per second.
8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles
which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path
and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise
missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1(b)
of Article IX.
First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in
excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a
range in excess of 600 kilometers.
Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design
features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the
maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode
flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earths
sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.
Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which
sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been
flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be
considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which
sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are
not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be
considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise
missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.
Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless,
guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers,
nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.
Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty
to flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such
plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of
such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to
target drones.
Article III
1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not
to exceed 2,400.
2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250,
and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of
this aggregate number.
3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article
and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the
composition of these aggregates.
4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided
for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such
missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.
5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the
aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in
Article XI.
Article IV
1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.
2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers.
3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of
older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed
after that time.
4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM
silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher
by more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to
determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original
diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these
dimensions.
Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty
refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal
volume, as of May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes
operational, whichever is later.
Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV
of the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or
the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount
greater than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of
the ICBM silo launcher by thirty-two percent solely through an increase in one of
these dimensions.
5. Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic
missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance,
training, and replacement requirements;
(b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal
deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers;
© not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.
Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements," as used in
paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each
ICBM launcher.
6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under
construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article
III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.
Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article
IV of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present
construction practices of each Party.
7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launchweight
greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either
launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either
Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.
First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully
loaded missile itself at the time of launch.
Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight
of:
(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;
(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or
more reentry vehicles; and
© its penetration aids, including devices for their release.
Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the
definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to
paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and
targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more
reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their
reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity or more than 1,000 meters
per second.
8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles
which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for
this purpose.
Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States
of America as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested
only with a single reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile,
the reentry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate device for targeting the reentry
vehicle of that missile.
9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is,
types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flighttest
and deploy one new type of light ICBM.
First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs," as used in paragraph 9 of
Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 in any one or more of the following respects:
(a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the
throw-weight, of the missile;
(b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages.
First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph
9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter,
the launch-weight, and the throw-weight of the missile, means a difference in excess
of five percent.
Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM
permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have
the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of
each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that
Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the
last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier,
ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be
different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter,
the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile.
A Party which launches ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted pursuant
to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall promptly notify the other Party of the
date of the first launch and of the date of either the twenty-fifth or the last launch
before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.
Second Common Understanding. As used in the Second Agreed Statement to
paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length,
the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a
difference in excess of five percent from the value established for each of the above
parameters as of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment
begins, whichever occurs earlier. The values demonstrated in each of the above
parameters during the last twelve of the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve
launches before deployment begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall
not vary by more than ten percent from any other of the corresponding values
demonstrated during those twelve launches.
Third Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and
throw-weight, provided for in the First Agreed Statement and the First Common
Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flighttesting
or the deployment of ICBMs with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration
aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum
number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as
of May 1, 1979, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight
in excess of five percent.
In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease
in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flighttesting
or the deployment of ICBMs with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the
propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than
the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained
dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type
have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, provided that such an ICBM is at the same
time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids,
or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of
penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1,
1979, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only
from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and
the reduction in the quantity of propellant.
Fourth Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and
throw-weight, provided for in the Second Agreed Statement and the Second Common
Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flighttesting
or the deployment of ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to
each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with fewer reentry
vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry
vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type
have been flight-tested, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throwweight
in excess of five percent.
In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease
in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flighttesting
or the deployment of ICBMs of that type with a lesser quantity of propellant,
including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other
appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant
of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which
ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, provided that such an ICBM is at the
same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration
aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum
number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested,
and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from
the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the
reduction in the quantity of propellant.
10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as
of May 1, 1979 with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number
of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that
date.
First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with
MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set
forth below:
For the United States of America
• ICBMs of the Minuteman III type -- Seven reentry vehicles;
• SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type -- Fourteen reentry vehicles;
• SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type -- Seven reentry vehicles.
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
• ICBMs of the RS-16 type -- Four reentry vehicles;
• ICBMs of the RS-18 type -- Six reentry vehicles;
• ICBMs of the RS-20 type -- Ten reentry vehicles;
• SLBMs of the RSM-50 type -- Seven reentry vehicles.
Common Understanding. Minuteman III ICBMs of the United States of America
have been deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles. During the term of the
Treaty, the United States of America has no plans to and will not flight-test or deploy
missiles of this type with more than three reentry vehicles.
Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM
after May 1, 1979, the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not
exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of
corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of
the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are
understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or
dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is
actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense
penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for
dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile
defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry
vehicles.
Third Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with multiple reentry vehicles, of a
type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with reentry vehicles the weight of any of which
is less than the weight of the lightest of those reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of
that type has been flight-tested as of that date;
(b) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and
without an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as
of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than the weight of
the lightest reentry vehicle on an ICBM of a type equipped with MIRVs and flighttested
by that Party as of May 1, 1979; and
© not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and with
an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of May
1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than fifty percent of the
throw-weight of that ICBM.
11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type
permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of reentry vehicles
greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either
Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.
First Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy the one
new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV
of the Treaty with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of
reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of the
twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that
type, whichever occurs earlier.
Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM
after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not
exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of
corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of
the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are
understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or
dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is
actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense
penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for
dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile
defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry
vehicles.
12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of
reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an
SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen.
First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with
MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set
forth below:
For the United States of America
• ICBMs of the Minuteman III type -- Seven reentry vehicles;
• SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type -- Fourteen reentry vehicles;
• SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type -- Seven reentry vehicles.
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
• ICBMs of the RS-16 type -- Four reentry vehicles;
• ICBMs of the RS-18 type -- Six reentry vehicles;
• ICBMs of the RS-20 type -- Ten reentry vehicles;
• SLBMs of the RSM-50 type -- Seven reentry vehicles.
Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM
after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not
exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of
corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of
the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or dispensing" are
understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or
dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is
actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense
penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for
dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile
defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry
vehicles.
13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of
reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an
ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.
Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after
May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed
the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding
types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In
this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to
mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its
reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or
dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be
considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long
as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those
for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.
14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped
for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers a number of such
cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 28 and the number of such heavy
bombers.
First Agreed Statement. For the purposes of the limitation provided for in paragraph
14 of Article IV of the Treaty, there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy
bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers the maximum number of such missiles for which any bomber of that type
is equipped for one operational mission.
Second Agreed Statement. During the term of the Treaty no bomber of the B-52 or
B-1 types of the United States of America and no bomber of the Tupolev-95 or
Myasishchev types of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be equipped for
more than twenty cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
Article V
1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III,
each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with
MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers to an aggregate number not to
exceed 1,320,455.
2. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party
undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200.
3. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party
undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate
number not to exceed 820.
4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the
aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the
maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one
operational mission.
Agreed Statement. If a bomber is equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, all
bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for ASBMs equipped with
MIRVs.
5. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Article
and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the
composition of these aggregates.
Article VI
1. The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:
(a) operational;
(b) in the final stage of construction;
© in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.
2. Those arms in the final stage of construction are:
(a) SLBM launchers on submarines which have begun sea trials;
(b) ASBMs after a bomber of a type equipped for such missiles has been brought out
of the shop, plant, or other facility where its final assembly or conversion for the
purpose of equipping it for such missiles has been performed;
© other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembled in a shop, plant, or
other facility after they have been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility
where their final assembly has been performed.
3. ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in
Article V, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that
limitation, shall become subject to that limitation as follows:
(a) fixed ICBM launchers when work on their conversion reaches the stage which first
definitely indicates that they are being so converted;
(b) SLBM launchers on a submarine when that submarine first goes to sea after their
conversion has been performed.
Agreed Statement. The procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of Article VI of the
Treaty shall include procedures determining the manner in which mobile ICBM
launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the
Treaty, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation,
shall become subject to that limitation, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM
launchers shall not be deployed after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in
force.
4. ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a bomber of a type
equipped for ASBMs which are not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V
into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are subject to that limitation shall
become subject to that limitation when the bomber is brought out of the shop, plant,
or other facility where such conversion has been performed.
5. A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1
of Article V shall become subject to that limitation when it is brought out of the shop,
plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a heavy bomber of a type
equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. A bomber
of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article III
shall become subject to that limitation and to the limitation provided for in paragraph
1 of Article V when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has
been converted into a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a
range in excess of 600 kilometers.
6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be
subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease
to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon.
Agreed Statement. The procedures for removal of strategic offensive arms from the
aggregate numbers provided for in the Treaty, which are referred to in paragraph 6 of
Article VI of the Treaty, and which are to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative
Commission, shall include:
(a) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Article V of
the Treaty, of ICBM and SLBM launchers which are being converted from launchers
of a type subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, into
launchers of a type not subject to that limitation;
(b) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Articles III
and V of the Treaty, of bombers which are being converted from bombers of a type
subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty or in Articles III and
V of the Treaty into airplanes or bombers of a type not so subject.
Common Understanding. The procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) of the
Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty for removal of bombers
from the aggregate numbers provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty shall be
based upon the existence of functionally related observable differences which indicate
whether or not they can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not
they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a
range in excess of 600 kilometers.
7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the
Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of
this Article.
Article VII
1. The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test
and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer
space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers
used only for testing or training.
Common Understanding. The term "testing," as used in Article VII of the Treaty,
includes research and development.
2. The Parties agree that:
(a) there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and
training launchers or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(b) construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken
onlyfor purposes of testing and training;
© there shall be no conversion of ICBM test and training launchers or of space
vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations provided for in
Article III.
First Agreed Statement. The term "significant increase," as used in subparagraph
2(a) of Article VII of the Treaty, means an increase of fifteen percent or more. Any
new ICBM test and training launchers which replace ICBM test and training
launchers at test ranges will be located only at test ranges.
Second Agreed Statement. Current test ranges where ICBMs are tested are located:
for the United States of America, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape
Canaveral, Florida; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the areas of
Tyura-Tam and Plesetskaya. In the future, each Party shall provide notification in the
Standing Consultative Commission of the location of any other test range used by that
Party to test ICBMs.
First Common Understanding. At test ranges where ICBMs are tested, other arms,
including those not limited by the Treaty, may also be tested.
Second Common Understanding. Of the eighteen launchers of fractional orbital
missiles at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, twelve
launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to
launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization.
Dismantling or destruction of the twelve launchers shall begin upon entry into force
of the Treaty and shall be completed within eight months, under procedures for
dismantling or destruction of these launchers to be agreed upon in the Standing
Consultative Commission. These twelve launchers shall not be replaced.
Conversion of the six launchers may be carried out after entry into force of the Treaty.
After entry into force of the Treaty, fractional orbital missiles shall be removed and
shall be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1© of Article IX and of
Article XI of the Treaty and shall not be replaced by other missiles, except in the case
of conversion of these six launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization.
After removal of the fractional orbital missiles, and prior to such conversion, any
activities associated with these launchers shall be limited to normal maintenance
requirements for launchers in which missiles are not deployed. These six launchers
shall be subject to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty and, if converted, to the
provisions of the Fifth Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of Article II of the
Treaty.
Article VIII
1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such
aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.
Agreed Statement. For purposes of testing only, each Party has the right, through
initial construction or, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII
of the Treaty, by conversion, to equip for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs no more than sixteen airplanes, including airplanes
which are prototypes of bombers equipped for such missiles. Each Party also has the
right, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, to
flight-test from such airplanes cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to flight-test
ASBMs from such airplanes as well, unless the Parties agree that they will not flighttest
ASBMs after that date. The limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty
shall not apply to such airplanes. The aforementioned airplanes may include only:
(a) airplanes other than bombers which, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph
1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, have been converted into airplanes equipped for cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs;
(b) airplanes considered to be heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3© or 3(d) of
Article II of the Treaty; and
© airplanes other than heavy bombers which, prior to March 7, 1979, were used for
testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
The airplanes referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Agreed Statement shall
be distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from
airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission
of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers or for ASBMs.
The airplanes referred to in subparagraph © of this Agreed Statement shall not be
used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers after the
expiration of a six-month period from the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless
by the expiration of that period they are distinguishable on the basis of functionally
related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same
type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable
of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
First Common Understanding. The term "testing," as used in the Agreed Statement
to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, includes research and development.
Second Common Understanding. The Parties shall notify each other in the Standing
Consultative Commission of the number of airplanes, according to type, used for
testing pursuant to the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty.
Such notification shall be provided at the first regular session of the Standing
Consultative Commission held after an airplane has been used for such testing.
Third Common Understanding. None of the sixteen airplanes referred to in the
Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty may be replaced,
except in the event of the involuntary destruction of any such airplane or in the case of
the dismantling or destruction of any such airplane. The procedures for such
replacement and for removal of any such airplane from that number, in case of its
conversion, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.
2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which
can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of
Article II.
Article IX
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:
(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on
waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles;
Common Understanding to subparagraph (a). The obligations provided for in
subparagraph 1(a) of Article IX of the Treaty do not affect current practices for
transporting ballistic missiles.
(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on
the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil
thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the
ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles
for such launchers;
Agreed Statement to subparagraph (b). The obligations provided for in
subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX of the Treaty shall apply to all areas of the ocean
floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the
1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof.
© systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons
of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;
Common Understanding to subparagraph ©. The provisions of subparagraph 1©
of Article IX of the Treaty do not require the dismantling or destruction of any
existing launchers of either Party.
(d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of
the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the
light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or
launchers of such SLBMs; or
(f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of
the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the
light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.
First Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The launch-weight of an
SLBM or of an ASBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of
launch.
Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The throw-weight of an
SLBM or of an ASBM is the sum of the weight of:
(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;
(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or
more reentry vehicles; and
© its penetration aids, including devices for their release.
Common Understanding to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The term "other appropriate
devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM in
the Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs 1(e) and (f) of Article IX of the
Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles;
and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry
vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional
velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.
2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a
range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently
targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft.
Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if
maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic
trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is
accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.
Article X Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of
strategic offensive arms may be carried out.
Article XI
1. Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers
provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this
Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the
Standing Consultative Commission.
2. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of
the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin on the date
of the entry into force of this Treaty and shall be completed within the following
periods from that da