SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY (TREATY OF RAROTONGA)



Opened for Signature: 6 August 1985.
Entered into Force: 11 December 1986.
Number of Parties: 13 full members ─ Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. The five nuclear-weapon States, China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States ratified the Treaty’s relevant Protocols.
Duration: Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely.
Organs: Consultative Committee, Director.
Treaty Text
Background and Developments: The States in the Asia-Pacific region became concerned with nuclear weapon issues following the nuclear detonations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when the region became a testing ground for such weapons. From 1946-1958, the United States conducted some 66 atmospheric and underwater tests in the Marshall Islands in the northern Pacific region, which lies outside the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ). The United Kingdom conducted atmospheric tests between 1952-1957 on Australian territory at Maralinga, Emu Field, and Monte Bello Island. Both the United Kingdom and the United States conducted atmospheric nuclear tests on Christmas Island until the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, which banned further atmospheric nuclear detonations. That same year, France established a nuclear test site in its French Polynesian atolls and carried out some 190 nuclear detonations (including more than 40 above ground) between 2 July 1966 and early 1996 at the Mururoa and Fangataufa sites.
The South Pacific States, besides being concerned with nuclear testing in their region and its vicinity, were also worried about the dumping of nuclear wastes at sea, fearing radioactive contamination of the marine environment. The South Pacific Forum (SPF) took up the issue in 1975 in response to a pro-posal by New Zealand calling for the setting up of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the region. This proposal was endorsed by the UN General As-sembly that same year. In 1979, in response to reports

of nuclear dumping in the region, the SPF strongly condemned the use of the Pacific as a dumping ground for nuclear wastes. Japan also opposed nu-clear dumping in the Pacific.
In 1983, Australia revived the concept of a SPNFZ at a SPF meeting held in Canberra. The following year, meeting in Tuvalu, the Forum endorsed a set of prin-ciples proposed by Australia as a basis for establish-ing a zone and appointed a Working Group to draft a treaty text. These principles aimed at preventing the region from becoming an arena for superpower ri-valry, preserving peace and security, and protecting natural resources as well as the well-being and liveli-hood of the South Pacific peoples.
The Working Group used the Tlatelolco, Antarctic, and the Seabed treaties, the PTBT and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to guide its work. The Treaty of Rarotonga was signed in Rarotonga (Cook Islands) on 6 August 1985, and entered into force on 11 December 1986 with the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification. The Treaty has 13 signato-ries, and 12 ratifications: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa (Tonga has yet to ratify). Three dependent territories not located within the zone (Marshall Islands Republic, Federated States of Mi-cronesia, and Palau) are not parties to the Treaty al-though eligible to be Parties. If they decide to join the SPNFZ Treaty, the SPNFZ area would be enlarged to incorporate the territory of each new party. The SPNFZ contributes to limiting the threat posed by nuclear weapons and serves to strengthen the NPT regime and nuclear nonproliferation.
Seven Dialogue Partners: The SPNFZ partners are Canada, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (France was one of the dialogue partners, but its dialogue partner status was suspended in 1995 in protest of its nuclear tests in Mururoa but restored in 1996.)
Obligations: States Parties are obliged not to manu-facture or otherwise acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device anywhere inside or outside the Treaty zone; not to seek or receive any assistance in this; not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nu-clear explosive device by any State; and not to pro-

vide sources or special fissionable materials or equipment to any non-nuclear weapon State (NNWS), or any nuclear weapon State (NWS) unless it is subject to safeguards agreements with the (International Atomic Energy Agency) IAEA. States Parties are also obligated to prevent in the territory of States Parties the stationing of any nuclear explosive device; to prevent the testing of any nuclear explo-sive device; not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea, anywhere within the SPNFZ, and to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in the territorial sea of the States Parties.
Treaty Zone: Under Annex I, the Treaty Zone cov-ers an extensive part of the South Pacific.
Verification and Compliance: Verification: Verifi-cation is achieved by providing reports and exchang-ing information, and by the application of IAEA safeguards. Visits by foreign ships and aircraft to ports and airfields, transit of airspace by foreign air-craft, and navigation by foreign ships carrying nu-clear weapons are left to the discretion of States Par-ties. Compliance: Treaty compliance is verified through the enforcement of IAEA safeguards agree-ments.
Protocol I calls on each Party with respect to the territories situated within the SPNFZ for which it is internationally responsible, to apply the prohibitions of the Treaty. On 25 March, 1996, France, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the Protocol, thereby expanding the Treaty’s scope of application to the American Samoa and Jarvis Island, as well as to the dependent territories of France and the United Kingdom. France ratified Protocol I on 20 Septem-ber, 1996, and the United Kingdom on 19 September, 1997. The United States has not yet ratified Proto-col I.
Protocol II calls on the NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any Party to the Treaty or against each other’s territories located within the zone. China signed this protocol in 1987, the USSR in 1986. The USSR stated that in case of action taken by a Party or Parties violating their commitments concerning the status of the zone, it would consider itself free of its non-use commit-ments. The same would apply in case of aggression committed by one or several Parties to the Treaty supported by a NWS, or together with it, involving the use by such a State of the territory, airspace, terri-torial sea, or archipelago waters of the Parties for visits by nuclear weapon-carrying ships and aircraft or for transit of nuclear weapons. However, the USSR eventually ratified the Protocol without refer-ence to the above statement.

The remaining three NWS signed the Protocol on 25 March 1996 (after France ceased nuclear weapon testing in the zone). China ratified Protocol II on 21 October 1988, France on 20 September 1996, the United Kingdom on 19 September 1997, and the USSR on 21 April 1988. The United States has yet to ratify Protocol II.
Protocol III calls on the NWS not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone established by the Treaty. China signed this protocol in 1987, the USSR in 1986, whereas the remaining three NWS signed it on 25 March 1996 (after France ceased nuclear weapon testing in the zone). China ratified Protocol II on 21 October 1988, France on 20 September 1996, the United Kingdom on 19 September 1997, the USSR on 21 April 1988. US ratification of Protocol III is still pending.
In its statement of reservation and interpretation, the French government made it clear that it did not con-sider its inherent right to self-defense to be restricted by the signed documents, that assurances provided for in Protocol II were the same as those given by France to the NNWS parties to the NPT, and that it would not be bound by its undertaking under Proto-col II in the case of an invasion or any other attack carried out or sustained by a party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a NWS, or if material breach of the nonproliferation obligations under the Treaty were committed.
The US government signed the protocols without reservation, but its spokesman said that “certain dec-larations and understandings” would be proposed to the Senate for incorporation in the resolution of rati-fication. The United States stated that its practices and procedures in the South Pacific were not incon-sistent with the Treaty and its protocols. However, it has yet to ratify the protocols. The United States said it would not accept any limitation on the right of pas-sage of its nuclear vessels and aircraft in the region.
The Treaty of Rarotonga is considered an improve-ment upon the Tlatelolco Treaty in preventing the dumping of nuclear wastes and banning nuclear ex-plosions even for peaceful purposes.